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A BLACK PARTY? TIMMONS, BLACK




In a pair of 1997 electoral decisions, the Supreme Court decided
that Minnesota could prohibit fusion candidacies in the interest of
maintaining a strong two-party system, but that Georgia could not
create two new majority-minority congressional districts because the
redistricting process had been impermissibly infected by race. In this
Article, Professor Smith argues that these two decisions unavoidably
conflict. While the fusion case reaffirmed the states’ interest in main-
taining a strong two-party system, the racial gerrymandering case se-
verely undercut the states’ ability to achieve this interest in jurisdic-
tions where the major parties are racially stratified. He demonstrates
that blacks operating in a third party could constitutionally obtain the
creation of majority-black congressional districts, a result that the
Court has denied them when they act within one of the major parties.
Professor Smith argues that such an anomaly encourages black exit
from the two-party system. He argues that the Court’s failure to insist
on an injury to voting in the racial gerrymandering case makes it im-
possible for the Court to fashion relief that is consistent with states’
interest in two-party stability.
       † Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1986, Brown
University; J.D. 1989, New York University School of Law. Many thanks to Paulette Caldwell,
Robert Chang, Margaret Chon, Linda Greene, Darren Hutchinson and Karen Porter for their
generous and influential comments on an earlier draft of this Article. A later draft benefited
from the criticisms of George Cochran, Jill Fisch, Laughlin McDonald and Barbara Phillips
Sullivan. Jason Abramson provided excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In his essay “Notes For A Hypothetical Novel: An Address,”1
James Baldwin describes a compulsion to speak that would overcome
all but the most impervious of human beings. The author writes of a
friend who has just murdered his own mother and stowed her away in
a closet. Baldwin knows what has just transpired, and more impor-
tantly, the friend is aware of Baldwin’s knowledge. Both men con-
spire to remain silent, to interact with each other as if all were nor-
mal, but Baldwin’s conscience interferes with his attempt at feigned
ignorance of the body’s presence. Conversational paralysis sets in
shortly because, as Baldwin writes, “we can’t talk about anything be-
1. JAMES BALDWIN, Notes for a Hypothetical Novel: An Address, in NOBODY KNOWS MY
NAME 141 (1961).
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cause we can’t talk about [the murder, the body]. No matter what I
say I may inadvertently stumble on this corpse.”2
The affliction that besets Baldwin’s relationship with his mur-
derous friend is, to Baldwin’s mind, a metaphor for the
“incoherence” of an American society that has steadfastly resisted
performing the cathartic act of acknowledging the badges of its racist
past.3 On this score, the essay’s symbolism captures not only the ra-
cially tense state of affairs that seems endemic to American society,
but also the dysfunction that is its inevitable by-product. No facet of
American life is immune from this race-induced stultification, but
nowhere is it more visible than in American politics and in the consti-
tutional constraints imposed on the body politic by the Supreme
Court. In a pair of 1997 electoral decisions, the Court again demon-
strated that it, too, is a prisoner of Baldwin’s dilemma, for its at-
tempts to homogenize American politics in these cases may, like the
body in the closet of Baldwin’s friend, have the unintended effect of
accentuating fault lines—in this case racial.
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,4 the Court addressed
the right of a minor political party, the Twin Cities Area New Party,
to co-nominate a Democratic candidate as its nominee for office. The
New Party is a progressive one with a heavy minority membership.5
In upholding Minnesota’s ban on such “fusion” candidacies against
the party’s First Amendment freedom of association challenge, the
Court reaffirmed the states’ interest in ensuring political stability,
even at the cost of favoring the two established major parties.6 Writ-
ing for a six-justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that
“the States’ interest permits them to enact reasonable election regu-
lations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party sys-
tem . . . .  The Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to de-
cide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party
system.”7 Paradoxically, although the Court concluded that the need
for two-party stability justified Minnesota’s ban on multi-party nomi-
2. Id. at 150.
3. See id. at 150-53.
4. 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
5. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, The Court Toasts the Two-Party System, 29
NAT’L J. 890 (1997) (reporting that the New Party consisted largely of union members, anti-
poverty workers, environmentalists and minority voters in approximately fifteen American
cities).
6. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374.
7. Id.
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nations, the fusion candidacy in this case would arguably have
strengthened the Democratic Party as much as the New Party be-
cause receiving the co-nomination could have broadened the Demo-
crats’ base of support. In effect, then, despite the dramatic erosion of
voter affiliation with the two major parties,8 the Court found that
states could protect their two-party systems by turning away voters
who are outside, and presumably alienated from, those systems.
Abrams v. Johnson9 marked the Court’s second installment in a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to majority-minority congres-
sional districts drawn in Georgia pursuant to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.10 As a result of an earlier Supreme Court decision invalidat-
ing a newly created majority-black congressional district,11 a lower
court reconfigured two of Georgia’s three majority-minority districts,
reducing the black population in each to below majority status and
leaving the state with only one black district.12 The black voters who
were parties to the suit responded that the lower court’s redistricting
improperly ignored the Georgia legislature’s intent to create at least
two black districts, and that, to the extent that only one was main-
tained, the court’s actions violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting
black voters’ voting strength.13 In rejecting these claims, the Supreme
Court found that Georgia’s earlier redistricting plans containing two
black districts did not reflect the will of the Georgia legislature since
these plans had been forced upon the legislature by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), with the aid of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and black voters and legislators.14 The Su-
preme Court also found that the black voters challenging the district
court’s substitute plan had not proven the requisite elements of a
8. See Alan Greenblatt, Politics and Marketing Merge in Parties’ Bid for Relevance,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Aug. 16, 1997, at 1967, 1969 (reporting that a plurality of voters now
identify themselves as independents rather than Democrats or Republicans). The phenomenon
of voters separating themselves from political parties rather than switching affiliations from one
party to another is known as “dealignment.” See DAVID G. LAWRENCE, THE COLLAPSE OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL MAJORITY: REALIGNMENT, DEALIGNMENT, AND
ELECTORAL CHANGE FROM FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT TO BILL CLINTON 21 (1996).
9. 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
10. See id. at 1929.
11. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
12. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1929-30 (citing Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D.
Ga. 1995)).
13. See id. at 1930.
14. See id. at 1931.
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vote dilution claim.15 Ironically, these voters would not have had to
prove vote dilution if the Court had simply required implementation
of the earlier redistricting plans that had won majorities in both
houses of the Georgia legislature.16 The Court dismissed these earlier
plans largely because black voters, with the aid of the government
and the ACLU, had successfully persuaded the State of Georgia to
enact them.17 Under the rule of Abrams, then, legislation may be-
come constitutionally tainted because the group seeking the legisla-
tion identifies its political interests through the prism of race. As the
Court had earlier stated, sanctioning black group identity politics in
redistricting would “bear[] an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid.”18
On first reading, Timmons, a First Amendment challenge to
Minnesota’s anti-fusion laws, and Abrams, a racial gerrymandering
decision, are an unlikely jurisprudential pairing. Yet their parallels,
and their ultimate antagonism, are as significant as they are subtle.
As for their common ground, in both cases the Court denied a disfa-
vored political minority equal access to the two-party system on the
erroneous assumption that an accommodation of their interests
would harm the political process. As for the conflict between the two
cases, Timmons and Abrams collide at the ballot box. While Tim-
mons purported to reaffirm states’ interest in maintaining political
stability through a strong two-party system, Abrams severely under-
cut states’ ability to achieve this interest in jurisdictions where the
major parties are racially stratified.
Under the Court’s disjointed ballot-box jurisprudence, the First
Amendment permits a state to employ the mantra of two-party sta-
bility to strip a minor party of its most cherished function—the nomi-
nation of the candidate of its choice—merely because the same can-
didate has also been nominated by a major party. Absent exceptional
circumstances, however, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a
state from intentionally creating majority-minority districts, even
15. See id. at 1936. These elements are: “[F]irst, the minority group ‘is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district’; second, the
minority group is ‘politically cohesive’; and third, the majority ‘votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.’” Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
16. See id. at 1943 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that both the dissent and majority
agreed “that the District Court should have drawn boundaries so as to leave two majority-
minority districts rather than one—unless there was no such state policy or preference”).
17. See id at 1931-34; see infra text accompanying notes 153-155.
18. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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though the creation of such districts may enhance two-party stability
by integrating into the political mainstream racial minorities who
might otherwise join the ranks of the New Party or similar minor par-
ties. Moreover, Timmons’ foreclosure of fusion candidacies encour-
ages racial minorities to break with the two-party process in an ex-
tremely destabilizing manner, for states may now force minor parties
to register their preferences (and maintain their existence) by run-
ning against major party candidates rather than forming ad hoc coali-
tions with them. The consequent splintering of the electorate, poten-
tially along racial lines, is far more destabilizing to the body politic
than an accommodation of the outsiders’ interests in Timmons and
Abrams would have been.
Racial splintering of the two-party system is not a hypothetical
musing. The Court has largely acceded to the states’ identification of
their two-party systems with political stability,19 and coalitional disin-
centives like those created by the Court’s holdings in Timmons and
Abrams can certainly adversely affect two-party political stability.
Such disincentives feed a budding backlash against a two-party sys-
tem that minority voters believe has taken them for granted. Ap-
proximately half of all African-Americans support the formation of a
separate black political party,20 while Hispanics express a comparable
level of support for a third party.21 Georgia’s redistricting experience
after the remand of Miller v. Johnson,22 the forerunner to Abrams,
foreshadows how the Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence threatens to
tap into this disenchantment and unhinge the two-party process.
When the Georgia Senate proposed a redistricting plan that con-
tained only one black congressional district, Congresswoman Cynthia
McKinney, whose majority-black district would ultimately be recon-
figured, led a coalition of blacks calling for the formation of a black
third party.23 McKinney said through a spokesman that “[black
19. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
20. See Clarence Page, White America Singing Bad-Times Blues, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 14,
1996, at 26. Among young African-Americans, more than 65% support the formation of an in-
dependent third party. See Lenora Fulani, Commentary, Blacks Need To Leave Dems, GOP
Behind, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at 11A.
21. See Tom Wicker, Deserting the Democrats: Why African-Americans and the Poor
Should Make Common Cause in Their Own Party, NATION, June 17, 1996, at 11 (reporting that
54% of Hispanics support the formation of a third party).
22. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
23. See Benjamin Sheffner, Just One Black District Included in Ga. Remap, ROLL CALL,
Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File; see also Marlon Manuel, Georgia
Blacks Consider Third Party; Democrats May Defect If Senate Map Adopted, ATLANTA
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Democrats] feel they are being pushed out (and) used as spare parts
to bolster the political fortunes of white Dixiecrats.”24 Georgia’s leg-
islature ultimately deadlocked on the proposed redistricting and
passed responsibility to the district court.25 That court imposed a plan
similar to the one that had prompted black leaders to call for mass
defection from the Democrats.26 The potential backlash against this
plan appears to have been forestalled by McKinney’s reelection in a
majority-white district, as well as by the reelection of Sanford Bishop,
another black representative whose majority-black district was un-
done by the court’s ruling.27 But how will black voters respond when
the trappings of incumbency are no longer present and the white
electorate in McKinney’s and Bishop’s districts reverts to historical
practice and votes against black and black-supported candidates?28
This Article explores the contentious relationship between race,
political affiliation and political stability. It argues that the Supreme
Court has induced political instability by failing to fashion a coherent
ballot-box jurisprudence that accommodates outsiders’ efforts to be
included in the political mainstream, namely the established two-
party system. This lack of coherence largely stems from the Court’s
insistence on color-blindness in politics, but even when race neutral-
ity has not been the impetus for its decisions, the Court has failed to
CONST., Sept. 4, 1995, at C1 (reporting Congresswoman McKinney’s statements that if only one
of three black congressional districts were retained, the formation of a third party would be “a
very serious possibility”).
24. Sheffner, supra note 23.
25. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
26. See id. at 1568.
27. See Christopher Weems, Georgia’s Congressional Districts Still In Uproar, ATLANTA
INQUIRER, Dec. 28, 1996, at 1 (reporting the reelections of McKinney and Bishop from re-
drawn, majority-white districts).
28. Prior to the creation of Georgia’s predominantly black Second and Eleventh congres-
sional districts, only 1% to 4% of white voters in the precincts within these districts voted for
minority candidates in statewide elections. See Laughlin McDonald, Can Minority Voting
Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson?, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 140 (1996). Although McKinney
and Bishop were reelected in their post-Abrams districts, there was substantial racial bloc vot-
ing in their elections. McKinney took only an estimated 31% of the white vote. See Kevin Sack,
Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at
A1. Bishop carried an estimated 36% of the white vote in his redrawn district. See id. John F.
Kennedy School of Government Professor Keith Reeves has concluded that McKinney's and
Bishop’s incumbency status in their former districts, and their concomitant fundraising advan-
tages, accounted for their reelection victories in the redrawn, majority-white districts. See
KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES & RACIAL
POLITICS IN AMERICA 109 (1997). Professor Reeves concurs with Representative McKinney’s
assessment of her reelection: “The real test of whether majority-minority districts are still nec-
essary will come from the minority candidates who vie for this seat after me.” Id. at 110.
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perceive the unique consequences that its decisions have on racial
minorities. Timmons and Abrams, individually and collectively, illus-
trate the Court’s misguided treatment of outsiders’ attempts to access
the political mainstream. Moreover, these cases illustrate the corro-
sive effect that the Court’s failure to respond effectively to such at-
tempts has on political stability—the very thing it is trying to protect.
The question—the accommodation of outsiders—can properly
be framed as one concerning when and to what degree courts should
defer to legislatures’ political judgments about who should partici-
pate in the political process and on what terms. This, of course, is the
classic judicial dilemma of the “political thicket.”29 Timmons and
Abrams add a new dimension to this problem because the Court’s in-
cursion into the political process in these cases encourages involun-
tary exit from the two-party system (a system states may legitimately
prefer) by political factions (racial minorities) whose integration the
Court purportedly desires.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets forth the historical
and theoretical bases for the Court’s sanction of a two-party political
process and extracts a model of party participation against which
Timmons and Abrams can be assessed. This section then presents
Timmons as an example of how the Court is unable to intelligibly ad-
dress outsiders’ demands to participate in the two-party paradigm.
Finally, Part I suggests a parallel between the Court’s treatment of
the New Party in Timmons and its curtailing of black aspirations of
representation in Abrams. Part II examines Abrams more fully and
argues that its holding disadvantages racial minorities with respect to
a central activity in the two-party system—redistricting—and thus
encourages less fidelity to that system. Part III argues that the
Court’s failure to insist on an injury to voting before granting relief in
cases like Abrams renders it unable to fashion relief that is consistent
with states’ interest in two-party stability. Far from maintaining two-
party stability, recognizing claims that seek the dismantling of major-
ity-black districts may well cause racial splintering of the two-party
process by encouraging blacks to seek through an independent party
what they have been denied as racial minorities within a major party.
Part IV extends the injury-to-voting analysis to Timmons. It argues
that the injury to the plaintiffs in Timmons was considerably more
concrete than that suffered by the plaintiffs in Abrams, while the
29. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (invoking the phrase to warn of the haz-
ards of judicial intervention in districting matters).
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Court’s intervention was incommensurately meager. Moreover, it ar-
gues that the Court’s heightened concern about state-created racial
categorizations cannot justify its lesser concern with the New Party’s
injury, since the New Party itself has a substantial minority member-
ship and asserted a claim based on the fundamental right of its mem-
bers to nominate the candidate of their choice. Part IV next explores
the intersection of Abrams and Timmons, arguing that the Court has
misapprehended the spectrum of activities by which individuals
(racial minorities in particular) might participate in the two-party sys-
tem and that the combined effect of these cases is to drive racial mi-
norities to the exclusionary point on the continuum. The Article con-
cludes that the Court must acknowledge the racial dimension of two-
party stability and must apply a redefined conception of political sta-
bility to racial gerrymandering decisions such as Abrams.
I. THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM AND A MODEL OF PARTY
PARTICIPATION
In order to appreciate the potential for a black apostasy of the
two-party system, it is critical to comprehend the precepts of that sys-
tem. Maintenance of a two-party system requires incentives to affili-
ate with the major parties and disincentives to avoid such affiliation.
This presents a three-dimensional problem of equality. First, courts
must define a principle for allocating political power between the
major parties. Second, courts must assess the constitutionality of bar-
riers to entry intended to prevent outsiders—minor parties like the
New Party in Timmons30—from competing against and ultimately in-
vading the province of the two-party duopoly. Outsiders, however,
can also exist within a major party as a disempowered pressure group
or “satellite party” that seeks to influence the party’s position on a
range of policy issues. Thus, the third issue that courts must consider
is the allocation of power to factions within the major parties—lest
30. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997). In the course of the
litigation, the New Party and its proponents advanced a “pressure-group” conception of third
parties, emphasizing the role of minor parties in communicating policy preferences rather than
defeating major-party candidates. See James Gray Pope, Fusion, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, and the Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50 RUTGERS L.J. 473, 491
(1998). At the same time, however, the New Party had hoped to use fusion to become a new
major party. See id. at 502. Although the New Party’s dual aspirations tend to blur the distinc-
tion between the equality claims of minor parties and pressure groups within major parties,
“historical evidence suggests that institutionalization through fusion tends to submerge third
party identities into those of their major party allies, thereby aborting third party challenges.”
Id. at 504.
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such factions exit and form third parties. The black voters in Abrams
essentially fall into this third category.31
The three prongs of the equality trilemma are interdependent.
The principles of equality set forth in the first inform the expecta-
tions of outsiders like the New Party and black voters. To the extent
that those expectations are disappointed, these outsiders are encour-
aged to exit the two-party paradigm, which may pose a more potent
challenge to two-party stability than would the accommodation of
their interests.
This Part begins by discussing the two-party model of political
participation that the Supreme Court appears to have embraced in its
ballot-box jurisprudence. The focus then shifts to Timmons, which
illustrates the difficulty the Court has had including outsiders in its
conception of two-party politics. This Part concludes by introducing
the parallel between the Court’s misapprehension of the outsiders’
claims in Timmons and its restrictions on the partisan activities of
black voters in Abrams.
A. The Two-Party System and The Problem of Equality
The Constitution does not mention political parties. Yet,
through its First Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has given constitutional sanctity to the American
two-party system. The constitutionalization of the two-party system
has derived, in part, from minor-party efforts to dislodge it. The Su-
preme Court, recognizing the states’ interest in maintaining the sta-
bility of their political systems against the potential splintering of the
electorate, has sustained the constitutionality of state laws imposing
strict requirements on minor parties attempting to gain access to the
ballot.32 Similarly, the Court has upheld state efforts to limit inde-
31. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). Blacks’ formal affiliation with either of the
two major parties has historically been accompanied by the formation of parallel or satellite
parties to force the major party to address issues of black oppression. See HANES WALTON, JR.,
BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES 80-81 (1972) [hereinafter WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES].
The distinction between this practice and the pressure-group model of fusion is one of degree
rather than kind.
32. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (approving Washing-
ton’s requirement that a minor party receive at least 1% of the votes in a blanket, all-party
primary in order to appear on the general election ballot); American Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) (upholding Texas’s 1% petition signature requirement for minor par-
ties in light of “the State’s admittedly vital interests . . . that political parties appearing on the
general ballot demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of community support”); Jenness
v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding Georgia’s requirement that minor party candidates
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pendent candidates’ access to the ballot by requiring such candidates
to have disaffiliated from major parties.33 In sanctioning such a provi-
sion, the Court stated:
[S]plintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant
damage to the fabric of government. It appears obvious to us that
the . . . disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the sta-
bility of its political system. We also consider that interest as not
only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the
candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than
an early decision to seek independent ballot status.34
Courts have employed the Equal Protection Clause to institu-
tionalize the two-party system by rejecting challenges to Democratic
and Republican state legislatures’ gerrymandering to protect incum-
bents;35 by permitting the drawing of legislative lines which reflect
each party’s relative proportion of the electorate;36 and even by al-
lowing one party to dilute the voting strength of the other dispropor-
tionately.37
The Court sees its preference for a two-party political system as
being distinctly Madisonian. The multiplication of political parties
implicates James Madison’s admonition in The Federalist No. 10 that
“the causes of faction”—a term Madison equated with political par-
ties— “cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the
means of controlling its effects.”38 According to Madison, those ef-
collect the signatures of 5% of the prior year’s electorate in order to be placed on general elec-
tion ballot). See also Terry Smith, Note, Election Law: Election Laws and First Amendment
Freedoms—Confusion and Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 597,
616-23 (critiquing the Court’s ballot access decisions).
33. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding California’s one-year disaffiliation
requirement).
34. Id. at 736 (citations omitted).
35. See generally Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerryman-
der, 74 TEX. L. REV. 913 (1996) (criticizing the courts’ general acquiescence to the incumbent
gerrymander).
36. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752-54 (1973) (upholding this practice).
37. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (reversing a district court’s finding of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering because “such a finding of unconstitutionality must
be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or ef-
fective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process”). While
Davis is a sword for the two major parties to employ against each other, it is likewise a shield
against the minor parties’ claims that the Democrats and Republicans have unfairly enshrined
their parties at the expense of fledgling third parties.
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Robert B. Luce ed., 1976). See also
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (citing Federalist No. 10 in approving California’s
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fects include “unsteadiness and injustice.”39 Commentators, too, have
hailed two-party politics as “a politics of coalition and accommoda-
tion rather than of ideological and charismatic fragmentation,” which
ensures that “there are few irreconcilable losers, and that the winners
can govern.”40
Perhaps no recent statement by a member of the Court more
forcefully extols two-party stability than Justice O’Connor’s pro-
nouncement in Davis v. Bandemer,41 a case in which the Court recog-
nized a cause of action for partisan gerrymandering but announced a
highly restrictive standard of proof.42 According to Justice O’Connor:
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable
two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to
sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our
political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on
the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both
stability and measured change. The opportunity to control the
drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of
apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the
United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active
participation in the political parties at every level.43
argument that its disaffiliation statute prevented “splintered parties and unrestrained faction-
alism”). As a matter of constitutional history, the Court may be mistaken in ascribing its pref-
erence for two-party political stability to Madison. Madison’s vision of politics was pluralist and
advocated the existence of several political parties in order to prevent majority tyranny. See
Note, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 158-59 (1983). But see Lloyd N.
Cutler, Now Is The Time for All Good Men . . ., 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 389 (1989)
(arguing that “faction,” as Madison understood the term, “would not appear to cover a broadly
based national political party that cuts across narrow interest groups”).
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 38, at 54.
40. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 22 (1971). But see Richard L.
Hasen, Entrenching The Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Pro-
tect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 356-58
(noting the circularity of defining political stability in terms of whether more than two parties
exist and arguing for a more empirical definition); Note, supra note 38, at 162 (“American po-
litical stability does not depend on a two-party oligopoly. The experience of other Western so-
cieties and historical experience in this country demonstrate that minor parties and independ-
ent candidacies are compatible with long-term political stability.”) (footnotes omitted).
This Article is agnostic on the question of whether the Supreme Court is empirically cor-
rect in its predictions of the unstable consequences of a multi-party system. However, an un-
derstanding of why the Court has embraced two-party politics is essential to a determination of
whether the Court has acted rationally to facilitate the existence of such a system, particularly
in a multi-racial polity. The latter question is the focus of this Article.
41. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
42. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
43. Davis, 478 U.S. at 144-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Davis illustrates the intersection of two fundamental issues in
American politics and jurisprudence: the degree to which the Consti-
tution tolerates partisan hegemony and the meaning of the right to
vote. In Davis, Indiana Democrats complained that a reapportion-
ment plan enacted by Republicans unfairly disadvantaged Democrats
in state legislative elections.44 While finding that the plan intention-
ally discriminated against Democrats, the Court nevertheless upheld
its validity:
[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it
more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect
the representatives of its choice does not render that scheme consti-
tutionally infirm. This conviction . . . stems from a perception that
the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning
elections.
. . . .
. . . [T]he question is whether a particular group has been unconstitu-
tionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political proc-
ess . . . . In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be
supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a ma-
jority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair
chance to influence the political process.45
The Indiana Democrats could not meet this onerous standard be-
cause their proof consisted primarily of the results of one election in
which the number of seats obtained by Democrats was dispropor-
tionately low in comparison to the statewide vote for Democratic
candidates.46
The claim of the plaintiffs in Davis was one of protective democ-
racy—that is, Indiana Democrats maintained that they possessed in-
adequate political influence.47 The Court’s treatment of that claim,
however, relied on notions of formal equality, a theoretical parity
44. See id. at 115.
45. Id. at 131-33.
46. See id. at 134-35.
47. See id. at 115. See generally James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitu-
tional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 893, 942 (1997) (“The essence of a protective democracy-based voting rights claim is a
claim of inadequate political influence. The claimant says, in effect, ‘My ability to influence the
political process is inadequate; as a consequence, I am unable adequately to protect my rights
and liberties.’”).
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that is presumed to flow from the equal access to the ballot.48 As the
Court concluded:
An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candi-
date is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning
candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candi-
date as other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a
situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate
elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true
even in a safe district where the losing group loses election after
election.49
The Davis majority harbored a romanticized view of politics. If
we could reasonably presume that the prevailing party would ade-
quately represent losers, then the very raison d’etre for parties would
evaporate. Moreover, if “the power to influence the political process
is not limited to winning elections,”50 there is little reason for defer-
ring to redistricting schemes, like the one in Davis, that enable a par-
ticular political party to do just that. It seems, then, that the Court’s
tolerance of mere formal equality ends where erosion of the two-
party system might begin. Some voters (members of the majority
party) are entitled to substantive equality as a reward for successful
participation in the party system:
[W]e think it most likely that whenever a legislature redistricts,
those responsible for the legislation will know the likely political
composition of the new districts and will have a prediction as to
whether a particular district is a safe one for a Democratic or Re-
48. Formal equality requires a symmetry of treatment among individuals regardless of
their race, sex or other “morally irrelevant” characteristics. Michael W. McConnell, The Im-
portance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of
the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1997). See also Paul Butler, Affirmative Ac-
tion and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 873 (1997) (noting that formal equality in
the criminal context means affording defendants the same degree of protection, regardless of
differences in the severity of the potential punishment). In the voting context, the “one person,
one vote” principle is an illustration of formal equality. See Gary Goodpaster, Equality and
Free Speech: The Case against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645, 649 (1997). Formal
equality is distinct from substantive equality, a concept which, like protective democracy, fo-
cuses on equality of outcomes. See id. at 646; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Consti-
tutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1072 (1996).
49. Davis, 478 U.S. at 132.
50. Id.
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
1998] A BLACK PARTY? 15
publican candidate . . . . The reality is that districting inevitably has
and is intended to have substantial political consequences.51
Thus, the lynchpin of the two-party process is the effort to control the
allocation of partisan representation.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence refines this point. It—and to a
lesser extent the majority’s holding—can be interpreted as a func-
tional approach to participation in the two-party process, one that
neither fully embraces formal equality nor totally rejects protective
democracy. In highlighting the importance of participating in the re-
apportionment process as an incentive for involvement in the two-
party system, Justice O’Connor acknowledges that party affiliation,
and by extension voting, is instrumental. In other words, formal
equality is insufficient; voters are rightly concerned with outcomes,
for representation is a scarce resource. Her concurrence admits still
more: if influencing the redistricting process is an incentive to par-
ticipate in the two-party system, a lack of influence is, by negative
implication, a disincentive to do the same. The question for the Court
is, when will an overreliance on precepts of formal equality prevent
states from achieving the very goal—political stability through main-
tenance of a two-party system—that the Court has encouraged them
to seek? The model of party participation that one might reasonably
derive from the Court’s embrace of two-party political stability and
its uneasy containment of protective democracy is that the Court
must balance formalism against claims of substantive equality to fit
the needs of the two-party system. A formalistic jurisprudence that
creates significant incentives to exit the two-party process
(particularly by groups which lend it continuing vitality) is fundamen-
tally at odds with the concept of two-party stability and, by extension,
with the Court’s concept of modern democracy.
B. Timmons: The Elusive Quest for Two-Party Stability
It is a short leap from the rejection of a major party’s claim for
substantive equality in Davis v. Bandemer to judicial skepticism
about equality claims by minor political parties. In their simplest
form, such claims seek access to the ballot in order to compete
against the major parties.52 In their more complex incarnation, how-
ever, the minor party seeks access to the two-party system in order to
51. Id. at 128-29 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
52. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
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align itself with a like-minded, major-party candidate and thereby in-
fluence policy outcomes. Timmons involved a minor party in this lat-
ter situation.53 Like Davis, Timmons exposed the friction that inheres
in a duopolistic model of party participation which presupposes that
someone must lose but which also assumes that even the loser must
retain a measure of substantive equality to discourage exit from the
two-party paradigm.
In Timmons, the New Party, a liberal, multi-racial third party,
sought to co-nominate Andy Dawkins, the Democratic-Farmer-
Labor (“Democratic”) standard bearer, for a seat in the Minnesota
state legislature. Under the proposed arrangement, to which neither
Dawkins nor the Minnesota Democratic Party objected, Dawkins
would appear as the nominee of both the Democratic Party and the
New Party.54 Minnesota, however, prohibits such fusion candidacies.55
Because Dawkins had already filed a nomination petition as the
nominee of the Democratic Party, local election officers refused the
nominating petition of the New Party.56 The New Party sued in fed-
eral court, contending that the state’s ban abridged its associational
rights.57
Anti-fusion laws like Minnesota’s are an outgrowth of late nine-
teenth century efforts by then-dominant Republicans to scuttle coali-
tions between Democrats and minor political parties.58 The effect of
such laws was to reduce the number and diminish the significance of
third parties, many of which had thrived by virtue of fusion. As one
scholar has noted, minor political parties which had previously
formed electoral coalitions with Democrats tended to be subsumed
under the Democratic Party banner after anti-fusion legislation be-
came prevalent:
53. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1367-68 (1997).
54. See id. at 1368.
55. See MINN. STAT. § 204B.04, subd. 2 (1998) (“No individual who seeks nomination for
any partisan or nonpartisan office at a primary shall be nominated for the same office by nomi-
nating petition . . . .”). Fusion is also referred to as “multiple party nomination” or “cross-
filing.” See William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political
Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 683 (1995).
56. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1368.
57. See id.
58. See Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion
Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 289-90 (1980) (“By offering additional votes in a closely divided
electorate, fusion became a continuing objective not only of third party leaders seeking per-
sonal advancement or limited, tangible goals but also of Democratic politicians interested in
immediate partisan advantage.”).
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Because the adoption of a new composite name left the Democratic
name, with all of its appeal and tradition, to be used by minority fac-
tions . . . because of even more grotesque ballot complications under
the laws of some states, or merely because their greater national
strength gave them an advantage in all electoral contests, the Demo-
crats were ultimately able to insist successfully that the name
‘Democrat’ be adopted by all fusionists.59
Thus, anti-fusion laws, originally designed to disadvantage Demo-
crats, had the unintended effect of solidifying their fate as one of two
surviving parties in what became a two-party system.60
Purporting to balance the burden of Minnesota’s anti-fusion rule
against the state’s interests in enacting its law, the Supreme Court in
Timmons acknowledged that the New Party had a right to select the
candidate of its choice.61 That right, however, did not inexorably lead
to the right to select a particular candidate, such as one who was al-
ready the nominee of another party.62 According to the Court, “[t]hat
a particular individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular
party’s candidate does not severely burden that party’s association
rights.”63 Because the burden imposed on the New Party’s associa-
tional rights was not severe, Minnesota was not required to provide a
compelling justification for its law.64 Instead, the state was required
only to assert regulatory interests commensurate with the law’s im-
pingement. This required no empirical verification of its concerns.65
Ignoring the largely partisan genesis of anti-fusion laws, the
Court uncritically accepted Minnesota’s reasons for forbidding fusion
politics and even supplied reasons of its own. Although the state ad-
vanced a number of rationales, such as fear of voter confusion and
overcrowded ballots,66 both the majority and the dissent gave the
most serious and extended consideration to Minnesota’s interest in
preserving the stability of its political system. That interest, according
to the six-justice majority, “permits the Minnesota Legislature to de-
59. Id. at 304.
60. See id. But see Pope, supra note 30, at 484-89 (arguing that it is equally plausible that
fusion bans retarded the decline of third parties since such bans thwarted the tendencies of
third parties to lose their identities to their major-party allies).
61. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1372.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1373.
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cide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party
system.”67 Thus, the New Party’s desire to nominate its chosen candi-
date did not outweigh Minnesota’s need to “temper the destabilizing
effects of party-splintering and excessive factionalism.”68
In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg and in part by Justice
Souter, Justice Stevens chided the majority for even discussing the
merits of preserving the two-party system as a justification for Min-
nesota’s fusion ban.69 According to Justice Stevens, Minnesota itself
had not raised this argument.70 Justice Stevens maintained that, in any
event, the risks of factionalism caused by fusion were “speculative at
best.”71 To the contrary:
[T]he fusion candidacy is the best marriage of the virtues of the mi-
nor party challenge to entrenched viewpoints and the political sta-
bility that the two-party system provides. The fusion candidacy does
not threaten to divide the legislature and create significant risks of
factionalism, which is the principal risk proponents of the two-party
system point to. But it does provide a means by which voters with
67. Id. at 1374.
68. Id.
69. Souter agreed with Stevens that the majority should not have relied on the
“preservation of the two-party system” rationale in upholding the statute because the state had
not asserted it. Id. at 1381 (Souter, J., dissenting). He was unwilling, however, to join Stevens in
taking the extra step of rejecting the rationale because he could not discount the possibility that
it could be a “forceful one.” Id. at 1382 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 1379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1380 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although made in support of another interest—
“protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots”—Minnesota offered a hypo-
thetical indirectly supporting its concern with excessive factionalism. The state feared that the
major parties might become tempted to splinter themselves into several different parties as a
means of appealing to various narrow interests. The Court explained the state’s concern as
follows:
Petitioners contend that a candidate or party could easily exploit fusion as a way of
associating his or its name with popular slogans and catchphrases. For example,
members of a major party could decide that a powerful way of “sending a message”
via the ballot would be for various factions of that party to nominate the major
party’s candidate as the candidate for the newly-formed “No New Taxes,” “Conserve
Our Environment,” and “Stop Crime Now” parties. In response, an opposing major
party would likely instruct its factions to nominate that party’s candidate as the
“Fiscal Responsibility,” “Healthy Planet,” and “Safe Streets” parties’ candidate.
Id. at 1373. Justice Stevens dismissed this hypothetical as “farfetched.” Id. at 1378 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). An additional and perhaps dispositive difficulty with Minnesota’s hypothetical is
that it focuses on a kind of factionalism with which the Court has not historically been con-
cerned. No matter how many party labels a candidate runs under, in fusion politics the same
candidate is elected. The fact that she may have divided loyalties is not a function of fusion but
rather is a common fact of life in a pluralistic democracy. Thus, even a candidate elected solely
under the Democratic banner may have to balance the interests represented by all of the puta-
tive parties in the Court’s example.
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
1998] A BLACK PARTY? 19
viewpoints not adequately represented by the platforms of the two
major parties can indicate to a particular candidate that—in addition
to his support for the major party views—he should be responsive to
the views of the minor party whose support for him was demon-
strated where political parties demonstrate support—on the ballot.72
Thus Justice Stevens conceptualized the New Party in much the
same way as the party, at least in the short term, saw itself: as a com-
plement to two-party stability.  The majority's rejection of this view
portrayed a one-dimensional understanding of two-party stability,
one which may in fact discourage active engagement in the two-party
process by political outsiders.
Timmons reflects the Court’s continuing inability to articulate
intelligible standards for assessing infringements on political parties’
associational rights,73 and its outcome is difficult to square with
precedent. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,74 the Court
upheld the state Republican Party’s attack on Connecticut’s closed-
primary law, which prohibited unaffiliated or independent voters
from participating in major-party primaries.75 In rejecting Connecti-
cut’s assertion that its closed-primary law furthered its interest in fos-
tering a strong two-party system, the Court stated:
The Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own association,
and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals,
is protected by the Constitution. “And as is true of all expressions of
First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the
ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irra-
tional.”76
Laws that discourage affiliation with any party whatsoever, such
as the open primary rule approved in Tashjian, surely threaten states’
interest in two-party stability. That is why the Court’s favorable
treatment of the alliance between Republicans and independents in
Tashjian dictates a different result in Timmons. Independent voters
pose a far greater threat to two-party political stability than does a
72. Id. at 1380-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73. See Smith, supra note 32, at 609-16, 621-28 (criticizing the Court’s unwillingness to set-
tle on strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for actions implicating the right to
vote).
74. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
75. See id. at 211.
76. Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981)).
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third party seeking the benefit of fusion, because independent voters,
by definition, hinder the maintenance of any party system.77
Members of the New Party had at least portrayed some fidelity
to a party system in general by actually belonging to a party, and to
the extant party system in particular by seeking to endorse a major-
party candidate. The Court cannot rationally protect the Republican-
independent arrangement in Tashjian but uphold Minnesota’s prohi-
bition against a considerably less destabilizing coalition in Timmons.
The crucial question ought to be the same as that in Tashjian: has the
major party consented to the arrangement at issue?78
The road from Tashjian to Timmons is a muddled one. No con-
sistent definition of “two-party stability” emerges from the cases, nor
do clear doctrinal rules. One thing that does emerge, however, is per-
haps more than a mere legal coincidence. In Tashjian, a major
party—the state Republican Party—challenged Connecticut’s closed-
primary rule. By contrast, in Timmons, an outsider group—a third
party—mounted a First Amendment challenge seeking access to the
two-party process. One cannot help but ask whether the Court’s re-
ceptivity to the mantra of two-party stability is colored by the politi-
cal position of the party defending against that argument. In Tash-
jian, an entrenched interest sought to define its associational rights.
In Timmons, the New Party sought to do the same, but, for reasons
77. The author has previously criticized Tashjian for its short-sightedness regarding Con-
necticut’s interest in two-party stability:
Given the trend toward dealignment [voter disaffiliation with both major parties],
the Court should have evaluated more critically the threat that the Party’s [open
primary] rule posed to Connecticut’s stable party government. Because of the
Court’s failure to undertake a critical examination, Tashjian could have accelerated
the dealignment process within Connecticut. Connecticut Republicans hoped to lure
independents to the Party by allowing them to help select the Party’s general elec-
tion candidate. However, in response, the state Democratic Party could adopt the
same rule. This would open both parties’ primaries to independents and would
eliminate the incentive for voters to register with either political party.
Smith, supra note 32, at 612 (footnotes omitted).
78. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.6 (distinguishing Tashjian from cases involving “claims
by nonmembers of a party seeking to vote in that party’s primary despite the party’s opposi-
tion”). Some have argued that major parties who decide that fusion is consistent with their
long-term interest can always change the anti-fusion law. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein,
Association Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1790
(1993). The teaching of Tashjian, however, is that absent questions of voter raiding, one major
party need not seek the permission of another in order to determine the consensual contours of
its membership. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 & n.13.
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which are difficult to reconcile with Tashjian, its efforts were deemed
politically destabilizing to Minnesota.79
The Court is conflicted in addressing outsider claims for access
to the two-party system, and its confusion prevents it from adhering
to the otherwise functional model of politics outlined in Davis. Were
the Court’s difficulties restricted to claims by minor parties, the dam-
age done to the fabric of the two-party paradigm might be relatively
limited. But, as explained more fully in Part II, the Court’s awkward-
ness with the New Party’s claim is quite similar to its treatment of
black voters’ efforts to participate in the two-party process in
Abrams. Indeed, the similarity is more striking than first meets the
eye, for the results in both cases are the same: a disparate adverse
impact on racial minorities. In focusing on judicial management of
partisan factions, Davis assumed away a dominant reality in Ameri-
can politics: the racialization of partisan factions.80 Timmons emu-
lated this approach, but by treating the New Party as raceless, the
Court ignored the disparate impact of its decision on black political
participation. This racial transparency81 is belied by the New Party’s
membership. People of color comprise approximately 40% of the
party’s membership and national executive committee.82 Likewise,
40% of its candidates are persons of color.83 This is no coincidence.
79. While one might intuit that states have less justification to intervene in a party’s pri-
mary than in the general election, it is difficult to see why the proposed coalition between the
New Party and the Democrats would be more destabilizing than the coalition between the Re-
publicans and independents simply because the former join forces in the general election rather
than a primary.
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 151-52 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(comparing racial vote dilution claims to partisan vote dilution claims and concluding that the
latter should not be justiciable because “members of the Democratic and Republican Parties
cannot claim that they are a discrete and insular group vulnerable to exclusion from the politi-
cal process by some dominant group”). But where blacks are an increasingly vital part of the
Democratic coalition and whites are correspondingly alienated from that party, see Edward G.
Carmines & Robert Huckfeldt, Party Politics in the Wake of the Voting Rights Act, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 117, 129-
30 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992), partisan gerrymandering may be no
different in its effect than racial gerrymandering.
81. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjec-
tive Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2012-13 (1995). White transparency is “the invisibil-
ity of whiteness to whites.” Id. at 2012 n.9. The effect of this invisibility is the tacit and uncon-
scious assumption that white norms are neutral despite their disparate effect on racial
minorities. See id. at 2012-13.
82. Telephone Interview with Adam Glickman, Communications Director, New Party
(Feb. 2, 1998). Ninety percent of the New Party’s people of color are African-American, while
some 10% are Latino. See id.
83. See id.
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
22 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1
The party has made a concerted effort to recruit racial minorities and
has used unusual (some would say old-fashioned) means to reach out
to these groups. House meetings, churches, meetings of low income
unions, and door-to-door organizing are the venues and methods of
choice for the New Party’s recruitment efforts.84 While the New Party
aims to become “multi-racial and working-class oriented,”85 its dis-
proportionate appeal to racial minorities is emblematic of the predis-
position that exists among these groups to exit from the traditional
two-party system.
As Abrams v. Johnson limits black options within the traditional
two-party structure, fusion politics becomes a desirable substitute for
the satellite-type politics in which blacks have traditionally engaged.
Fusion politics possesses the complementary features of permitting
racial minorities to maintain a separate identity from the major par-
ties—which after Abrams may be necessary—while simultaneously
allowing them to form ad hoc electoral coalitions when circumstances
warrant. By denying the fusion option to those whom it has alienated
from the two-party system, the Court in Timmons undermines two-
party stability, forcing blacks to run against the major parties.
II. DEFERENCE DUE, DEFERENCE DENIED: ABRAMS V. JOHNSON
Justice O’Connor has cast the deciding vote in three recent Su-
preme Court decisions that struck down majority-minority congres-
sional districts on the grounds that they were drawn with the exces-
sive use of race.86 Yet neither she nor the Court has developed a
predictable, coherent conception of when seeking to influence the
districting process ceases to be a “critical and traditional” means of
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). In each of the foregoing cases, the five-justice majority consisted of
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas. Justice O’Connor’s vote is appro-
priately characterized as decisive because she is the lone member of this bloc to be on record as
believing that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts is not presumptively uncon-
stitutional, see Bush, 517 U.S. at 993 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[S]o long as they do not sub-
ordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States
may intentionally create majority-minority districts . . . without coming under strict scrutiny.”);
and that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a provision to prevent the dilution
of minority voting strength, is a compelling justification for the creation of majority-minority
districts. See id. at 976-77. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Bush and her unpredictable legal
analysis in the racial gerrymandering cases have earned her the sobriquet of “swing vote.” M.
Elaine Hammond, Comment, Toward A More Colorblind Society?: Congressional Redistricting
After Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2151, 2191 (1997).
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participating in the two-party system87 and instead becomes an im-
permissible use of race. Viewed in terms of Justice O’Connor’s own
description of the political process in Davis, the manner in which
Georgia’s two new majority-black congressional districts were cre-
ated in Abrams is unremarkable. However, the Court in Abrams, in-
cluding Justice O’Connor, rejected the Davis Court’s conception of
redistricting as a normal part of politics, insisting that black legisla-
tors’ and voters’ successful efforts to influence the apportionment
process were infected by an impermissible emphasis on race. The dis-
harmony between Davis and Abrams suggests a singularly irrational
postulate: minority voters are free to engage in the critical and tradi-
tional partisan activity of seeking to influence the redistricting proc-
ess, but success in this endeavor may invalidate its outcome. This im-
probable legal principle and its inhibiting effect on black
participation in the two-party process are explored below.
A. Beyond Black and White
Suppose members of the Christian Conservative Coalition88 in
Georgia began flexing their growing political muscle. Coalition
members are overwhelmingly white and Republican, although they
tend to outflank Republicans on the right of certain issues. Principal
among these is abortion. The Coalition’s platform calls for a constitu-
tional amendment banning all abortions except in cases of rape or in-
cest, or to save the mother’s life, as well as for the appointment of
only “pro-life” judges to the federal bench.89 Furthermore, the plat-
form favors criminalization of the practice of abortion, and endorses
jail terms for doctors who perform the procedure. Frustrated that
fellow Republicans rarely go the distance in espousing the Coalition’s
views on abortion,90 the leadership of the Coalition threatens Repub-
lican members of the Georgia Assembly that if they do not create a
congressional district favoring the election of Ron Davis, a popular
87. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
88. This is a fictional group, modeled on the Christian Coalition.
89. Cf., e.g., Roni Rabin, Challenging The Religious Right, Aim to “Out” Christian Coali-
tion, NEWSDAY (New York), May 21, 1993, at 25 (reporting that the Christian Coalition op-
poses abortion except in cases of pregnancy due to rape or incest, or when the pregnancy en-
dangers the mother’s life).
90. Cf., e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Religious Right, Frustrated, Trying New Tactic on G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at A1 (reporting that conservative Christians believe that “the Re-
publicans they have helped to elect have been too timid and too passive at every crucial junc-
ture”).
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Republican state legislator who has been a fervent advocate of the
Coalition’s agenda, the Coalition will actively encourage its members
to sit out the next election, which would deprive Republicans of
much-needed conservative votes.91 The threat poses a serious prob-
lem to Georgia Republicans: Georgia is one of the most competitive
two-party states in the South, and neither major party can afford to
have its support siphoned off.92
Believing that on balance Republicans are better off accommo-
dating the demands of the Christian Conservatives, they agree to
draw a congressional seat which would include the entirety of Davis’
current legislative district. The Constitution is unlikely to stand in the
way of this redistricting. Since major parties can gerrymander to
achieve a roughly proportional allocation of seats between them-
selves,93 there is no reason to believe that they cannot gerrymander to
maintain an electoral coalition that is critical to the party’s success at
the polls.94 Moreover, Davis is for all practical purposes an incumbent
to a substantial part of the district in which he will be running, and
the Supreme Court has sanctioned gerrymandering in aid of incum-
bents.95 Thus, Christian Conservatives could lobby the legislature for
favored treatment in the districting process without occasioning con-
stitutional scrutiny.
91. Cf. Katharine Q. Seelye, Christian Coalition Criticism Irks G.O.P. Leader, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1998, at A24 (reporting that because the Christian Coalition believes that the Republi-
can Party “has been too accommodating to those who support abortion rights,” the group has
threatened to form a third political party); cf. Goodstein, supra note 90 (noting that the Chris-
tian right is currently focused on identifying and supporting conservative politicians in local
races).
92. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 327
(1994).
93. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (“[We do not have] a consti-
tutional warrant to invalidate a state plan . . . because it undertakes, not to minimize or elimi-
nate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting,
provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the state.”).
94. The Republicans’ deal with Ron Davis is a necessary precondition to achieving a parti-
san gerrymander and is, in effect, a partisan gerrymander in favor of the Republican Party.
While it may be true that the motive for the partisan gerrymander is the threat of Davis’ sup-
porters sitting out the election, the end result of the negotiation between Christian Conserva-
tive voters and Republicans in the state legislature is a partisan gerrymander consistent with
Gaffney v. Cummings.
95. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973) (“‘The fact that district boundaries
may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests between present incum-
bents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.’” (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 89 n.16 (1966))). Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (“Any number of consis-
tently applied legislative policies might justify some variance [in the population of congres-
sional districts], including, for instance, avoiding contests between incumbents.”).
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Now imagine a third party in Georgia called the New Black and
Tan Party.96 Its membership is composed almost exclusively of Afri-
can-Americans. The party was created because its constituents’ be-
liefs, life experiences, and political philosophies differ markedly from
those of the average white Georgian. For instance, a significant num-
ber of New Black and Tan Party members believe that they are not
treated equally in their communities.97 In addition, a majority of the
party’s members believe that they are not treated equally by the po-
lice.98 The members’ perceptions are not without foundation. Re-
search data show that a majority of whites view blacks as less intelli-
gent, less hardworking, and less patriotic.99 It would be surprising if
these opinions were not reflected in whites’ interactions with blacks.
Likewise, it is unsurprising that New Black and Tan members’ per-
sonal experiences and perceptions tend to translate themselves into
policy preferences. A majority of members, for instance, favor in-
creasing government affirmative action programs, while only ap-
proximately 22% of white Georgians support such a step.100 These dif-
ferences are not isolated but instead reflect a racial schism in policy
preferences between blacks and whites.101 Thus, a considerable gulf
96. This is a fictional party based on the Black and Tan Republicans. See infra notes 225-
226 and accompanying text.
97. Cf. GALLUP ORG., THE GALLUP POLL SOCIAL AUDIT ON BLACK/WHITE RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (June 10, 1997). The poll reported that only 49% of black respon-
dents said they were treated equally, while 76% of white respondents believed blacks were
treated equally. Forty-five percent of blacks said they either were not treated as well as whites
or were treated badly. See id. These findings reflect a nationwide sample group. For conven-
ience, the author assumes they reflect Georgians’ opinions reasonably accurately.
98. Cf. id. at 9 (reporting that 60% of black respondents believed that they were treated
less fairly by police, while only 30% of whites believed blacks were treated less fairly).
99. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 950-52 (1996) (discussing the findings of a 1990 National Opinion Research
Center study).
100. See GALLUP ORG., supra note 97, at 14.
101. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN POLITICS 182 (1994):
[E]ight years after the ‘conservative revolution’ heralded by the election of Ronald
Reagan, extraordinary political divisions persisted between blacks and whites . . . .
[Twenty- and thirty-] percentage point gaps between blacks and whites on some is-
sues are not uncommon, and often the two races end up on opposite sides of critical
policy questions. These enormous gaps serve to overwhelm what would normally be
considered significant variation in African-American public opinion, thus helping to
explain the seeming homogeneity of African-American political behavior.
Illustrative of this philosophical and political divergence are the views of blacks and whites on
government spending: 63% of blacks support increased spending on government services, while
only 33% of whites favor such a step. See id. at 183.
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separates members of the New Black and Tan Party from members
of the two major parties, most of whom are white.
Suspend disbelief for a moment longer and imagine that most of
Georgia’s 28% black population belong to the New Black and Tan
Party.102 Democrats, training their sights on the most powerful state-
wide offices, cut a deal with the New Black and Tan leadership. Spe-
cifically, the Democrats say, “in the next decennial reapportionment,
we’ll allot your party a proportionate share of the congressional seats
if you promise to support our gubernatorial and United States Senate
candidates.” Unless any self-interested political activity by a major-
ity-black party is impermissibly race-based, while the same activity by
a predominantly white group is not, no Supreme Court precedent
prohibits the above arrangement. Indeed, according to the Court,
“judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports
fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with
their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in
doing so.”103 Nor, under the Court’s political gerrymandering juris-
prudence, should it matter that New Black and Tan Party members
are somewhat geographically dispersed, thus requiring the creation of
oddly shaped congressional districts in order to give its members
majority status in approximately a fourth of the state’s congressional
districts. Again, in the Court’s own words, “compactness or attrac-
tiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal
constitutional requirement for state legislative districts,”104 and, as for
congressional districts, “[d]istricts not drawn for impermissible rea-
sons or according to impermissible criteria may take any shape, even
a bizarre one.”105
Under the hypothetical deal struck above, the New Black and
Tan Party would be entitled to three of Georgia’s eleven congres-
sional seats, the same number of black-majority districts that were in
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 34
(117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (reporting Georgia’s total population in
1997 as 7,055,000, with a black population of 1,966,000).
103. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
104. Id. at 752 n.18. But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (holding that
“circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics” can help to “prove that the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including . . . compact-
ness . . . to racial considerations”).
105. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But see Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (stating that “redistricting legislation that is so extremely ir-
regular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting” can be challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause).
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fact created by the state legislature in 1992.106 In Abrams v. Johnson,
however, the Court concluded that the creation of more than one
black congressional district in Georgia would offend the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection by impermissibly allowing race
to predominate in the redistricting process.107 What is the difference
between the black voters in the above hypothetical and actual black
voters in Georgia? The latter are Democrats, not members of a third
political party. Thus, Democrats cannot do for their own members
what they could theoretically do for a third party. Nor can they do for
blacks what Republicans can do for the Christian Conservative Coali-
tion, even though blacks are as central to the Democrats’ electoral
success as Christian (and largely white) conservatives are to the Re-
publicans’.108
B. Seeing Only Black and White
In the face of the Supreme Court’s avowed commitment to a
stable two-party system, a rule of law that makes it possible for a
third party to achieve what an interest group within one of the major
parties cannot is irrational on its face. Yet the Court’s attempt to
isolate notions of two-party stability from its recent racial gerryman-
dering decisions has wrought such an outcome. The Court’s current
campaign to cleanse the redistricting process of the perceived exces-
sive use of race began with Shaw v. Reno.109 Alluding to, but never
demonstrating, the dangers of stereotyping created by placing racial
minorities into voting districts in which they are a majority, the Court
in Shaw demanded compelling justification where race was the over-
riding districting criterion.110 Strict scrutiny was necessary, according
to the Court, because reapportionment based on race “reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which
106. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1930-31 (1997).
107. See id. at 1934-35.
108. See Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra note 80, at 131 (documenting increasing share of
Democratic presidential votes cast by blacks); David Grann, Close Races, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 11, 14 (regarding blacks as the Democratic Party’s “most devoted constitu-
ency”); Goodstein, supra note 90, at A1 (“The Republican Party is built on an uneasy alliance
of social conservatives, a constituency that includes the religious right, and economic conserva-
tives, committed to a smaller-government, lower-tax agenda.”).
109. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
110. See id. at 647.
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they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will pre-
fer the same candidates at the polls.”111
The Court subsequently applied its Shaw holding to a Georgian
majority-black congressional district in Miller v. Johnson.112 Miller
heralded two important themes that would recur in the Court’s re-
verse-racial gerrymandering decisions. First, the presence of race was
an inevitable feature of the redistricting process.113 Second, Miller es-
tablished that irregular shape was not a prerequisite to challenging a
district as an unconstitutional gerrymander.114 Instead, courts must
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a ra-
cial purpose predominated in the creation of a given district.115 While
commentators have opined that Miller fails to delineate clearly be-
tween permissible and impermissible race-conscious districting,116 few
have noted the constraints Miller would impose on the lobbying of
those who promote districting beneficial to racial minorities. Unlike
in Shaw, where the odd shapes of the black congressional districts
provided the principal evidence of the predominance of race,117 the
Court in Miller subjected Georgia’s District Eleven to strict scrutiny
in large part because the legislative process had allegedly overem-
phasized racial concerns.118 Indeed, the Court in Miller conceded that
“by comparison with other districts the geometric shape of the Elev-
enth District may not seem bizarre on its face.”119 Considering
“additional evidence” gleaned from the give-and-take of the legisla-
tive process, however, the Court was able to detect what it believed
was the predominance of race in Georgia’s redistricting plan.120 The
Court ultimately struck down District Eleven for failing to satisfy the
111. Id.
112. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
113. See id. at 916 (“Redistricting legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial
demographics . . . .”).
114. See id. at 912-13.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 607, 611 (1998) (describing Miller’s dominant purpose test as “vague and manipulable”
and even “incoherent”); Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 55-56 (criticizing the Miller test).
117. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). The white plaintiffs in Shaw objected to
North Carolina’s congressional districting plan because it was “so extremely irregular on its
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting.” Id.
118. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 917-20.
119. Id. at 917.
120. See id.
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most exacting constitutional scrutiny.121 It is helpful to review Miller’s
attention to legislative process as a predicate for understanding the
import of Abrams v. Johnson.
As a jurisdiction covered by the Voting Rights Act, Georgia, like
most southern states, must seek federal approval of its decennial
congressional redistricting prior to implementing any changes.122 It
may seek such “preclearance” from the United States Justice De-
partment, or, alternately, it may seek a declaratory judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that its
redistricting “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color
[or language].”123 The Justice Department’s determination is never
binding on a covered jurisdiction; at all times the state remains free
to seek a declaratory judgment from the federal district court.124
Opting for the administrative route, Georgia sought Justice De-
partment preclearance of its decennial congressional redistricting in
1991. The state’s original plan, fashioned by its General Assembly,
contained two majority-black districts, an increase of one from the
preceding decade.125 The Justice Department, however, refused to
preclear this plan, citing the possibility of placing more minorities in
121. See id. at 926-28.
122. See id. at 905. A state or locality becomes a covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act if it (1) maintained, as of a statutorily prescribed date, a “test or device” as a
prerequisite to voting and (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50% of the
jurisdiction’s voting age population were registered to vote or participated in the presidential
election of the indicated year. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994). The terms “test or device” refer
to literacy and character tests. 42 U.S.C § 1973b(c). The combination of the use of a test or de-
vice and low voter turnout correlates with covered jurisdictions’ histories of discrimination
against blacks at the polls:
Tests and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long history
as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious rea-
son that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual
voters. Accordingly, the coverage formula is rational in both practice and theory.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966). This coverage formula brought Geor-
gia under the preclearance requirements of section 5 as of August 7, 1965. See id. at 318.
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(2), 1973c (1994).
124. See id. § 1973c. See also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 329 (1998):
Although the Attorney General’s preclearance determination is not subject to judi-
cial review, his objection may be overridden as a practical matter, since a jurisdiction
may seek a declaratory judgment from the District of Columbia District Court with-
out regard to whether an objection was interposed in the administrative process.
That declaratory judgment is an entirely separate proceeding in which the adminis-
trative objection plays no role.
125. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 906.
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majority-black districts.126 When in a subsequent submission the state
adhered to its two-district plan while increasing each district’s black
populations, the Justice Department again refused preclearance, this
time citing the possibility of creating a third majority-black district.127
The Miller Court suspected that the Justice Department’s views had
been influenced by a draft plan advocated by the American Civil
Liberties Union, dubbed the “max-black” plan.128 Under this pro-
posal, various black populations in the majority-black Eleventh Dis-
trict would be transferred to the Second District, converting it into a
third majority-black district. Tracking this plan, the Georgia legisla-
ture proposed a redistricting plan containing three majority-black
congressional districts.129 The plan was precleared by the Justice De-
partment and resulted in the election of three black congressmen.130
Relying on Shaw v. Reno, voters in the Eleventh District sued,
claiming that the district was drawn on predominantly racial
grounds.131
In determining that race had overwhelmed the redistricting
process, the Miller Court relied not merely on the odd shape of Dis-
trict Eleven,132 as it appeared to do in Shaw,133 but also on the advo-
cacy of groups whose statutory (the Justice Department), organiza-
tional (the ACLU) and political (black legislators) roles were to
pursue results beneficial to minority voters.134 Yet this kind of partici-
pation in the districting process on the part of blacks—even when
126. See id. at 906-07.
127. See id. at 907.
128. See id. at 907-09. The Justice Department denied this, maintaining instead that it was
seeking to ensure that Georgia did not have a discriminatory purpose when it refused to create
three black districts in its first two preclearance submissions. See id. at 924. The weight of his-
tory supported the Justice Department’s contention. In the 1981 round of redistricting, white
Democratic elected officials had hostilely opposed the creation of a majority-black congres-
sional district. The Chairman of the Georgia House Permanent Standing Committee on Legis-
lative and Congressional Reapportionment, Joe Mack Wilson, had referred to blacks as
“niggers” and stated that he opposed the creation of a black district because he opposed
“nigger legislation.” Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 500 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 459 U.S. 1166
(1983). Likewise, the Speaker of the Georgia House, Thomas Murphy, expressed opposition to
the creation of “a black district where a black would certainly be elected.” Id. at 509-10. Given
this abysmal recent history, the Justice Department was only wise to inquire whether racism led
the Georgia Assembly to restrict the number of black congressional districts to two.
129. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 907-08
130. See id. at 909.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 917.
133. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
134. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 907-08.
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aided by the federal government or other organizations—is precisely
what Justice O’Connor recognized in Davis as core participation in
the two-party system.135 Since it is not illegal for a federal agency to
take sides in a policy dispute falling within its jurisdiction, and since
the ACLU certainly has a First Amendment right to petition the
government, the Court was misguided in resting the brunt of its
analysis on the roles of these entities in aiding black Georgians dur-
ing the redistricting process.
The Court in Miller allied itself with the lower court’s derisive
conclusion that “‘[the Justice Department] would accept nothing less
than abject surrender to its [black] maximization agenda.’”136 Fur-
thermore, although the very reason Georgia’s redistricting was sub-
ject to preclearance under section 5 was the state’s past resistance to
the black franchise,137 the Court relied on the potentially self-
interested statements of white Georgia officials who opposed the
creation of a third black district to bolster its conclusion that the Jus-
tice Department had forced Georgia to over-emphasize race.138
Oddly, the Court’s focus on the legislative and preclearance proc-
esses—rather than the geographical shape of the new black district—
threatened to silence advocates of minority interests while potentially
empowering voices which had historically been resistant to those in-
terests. Moreover, in finding Georgia’s District Eleven unconstitu-
tional, the Court made blacks the victims of their own success, even
though it is probable that if these voters had been any less vigorous in
pursuing their interests, they would have been entirely neglected.139
Thus, Miller created a black periphery in the two-party system. After
Miller, a major party can accommodate its black constituency only at
its own risk, for courts may now use blacks’ demands for representa-
135. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
136. Miller, 515 U.S. at 917 (quoting Johnson v. Miller (Johnson I), 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366
n.11 (S.D. Ga. 1994)).
137. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966) (noting that Georgia
had used literacy tests to disenfranchise blacks, and noting that the use of such tests as well as
depressed voter turnout were the triggering elements for coverage under the Voting Rights
Act). See also Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 67 (Chandler Davidson et al. eds., 1994)
(detailing “two centuries of deliberate and systematic discrimination [in elections] by the state
against its minority population”).
138. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 (noting the Georgia Attorney General’s objection to
the creation of a third black district).
139. For inferential support of this view, one need only examine the behavior of white
Georgia legislators during the 1981 redistricting when the state resisted the creation of even
one black congressional district. See supra note 128.
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tion, and any reinforcement they receive from the Justice Depart-
ment or other entities, as evidence that a state has gone too far in ac-
ceding to such demands. This new regime threatens the two-party
stability principles enunciated by Justice O’Connor in Davis140 and
espoused by a majority of the Court in Timmons.141
Since the Court found the plan calling for three black districts to
be unconstitutionally infected by race,142 it fell to the Georgia legisla-
ture to cure this infirmity. When the Georgia legislature failed at its
efforts to reconfigure its congressional map pursuant to Miller, the
district court had two options: it could either revive earlier state pro-
posals containing two majority-black congressional districts, or it
could fashion its own remedy.143 The district court recognized that it
was constrained in its ability to fashion its own remedy by Upham v.
Seamon,144 a case which held that a court-imposed redistricting plan
must depart from the legislature’s policies only to the extent neces-
sary to cure the constitutional violation at issue.145 The benchmark for
determining the political preferences of the Georgia legislature lay at
the heart of the controversy in Abrams.
The district court concluded that it was not bound by the earlier
districting plans containing two black districts,146 even though both of
those plans were passed by majorities in the Georgia legislature.147
According to the court, it was not required to use either of these
plans as a point of departure because both were the products of
“unconstitutional DOJ interference” rather than the will of the
Georgia legislature.148 The court did not explain how the Justice De-
partment’s role in the redistricting process could render the 1991
plans coerced when Georgia remained free to seek a declaratory
140. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
142. The Court in Miller only upheld the district court’s invalidation of District Eleven. See
Miller, 515 U.S. at 909. After the case was remanded to the district court to fashion an appro-
priate remedy, that court granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to add residents of Georgia’s Sec-
ond District to challenge the constitutionality of that district. See Johnson v. Miller (Johnson
IV), 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995). The district court concluded that District Two
had been created in much the same way as District Eleven, and that District Two was therefore
also unconstitutionally drawn. See Johnson v. Miller (Johnson III), 922 F. Supp. 1552, 1553
(S.D. Ga. 1995).
143. See Johnson IV, 922 F. Supp. at 1560.
144. 456 U.S. 37 (1982).
145. See id. at 42.
146. See Johnson IV, 922 F. Supp. at 1560.
147. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1927 (1997).
148. Johnson IV, 922 F. Supp. at 1560.
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judgment from a federal district court at every stage of the preclear-
ance process. Instead, the court repeated its earlier misgivings about
the Justice Department’s role and proceeded to devise its own plan
which reduced the number of majority-black congressional districts
from three to one149—a number representing only 9% of the congres-
sional districts in Georgia, compared to its 28% black population.
The court recognized, however, that its own plan needed to
comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under section 2 of the
Act,150 black voters may make out a claim of racial vote dilution
where they demonstrate that: (1) they are sufficiently numerous and
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district; (2) they
are politically cohesive; and (3) white voters vote as a bloc so as to
consistently defeat the minority-preferred candidate.151 While the
court acknowledged the constraints of the Act, it found that section 2
did not require it to create a second black district because there was
insufficient evidence of geographic compactness and racial bloc vot-
ing.152
Defendant-intervenors who sought the creation of a second
black district appealed the lower court’s ruling. Employing the same
focus on the legislative process adopted in Miller, the Supreme Court
in Abrams upheld the district court’s conclusion that it could not de-
fer to the state’s earlier two-district plans because they, too, reflected
an overuse of race.153 It first cited testimony from Georgia’s Director
of Reapportionment Services that the second black district, like the
third, had been designed as a concession to the Justice Department’s
max-black demands.154 This testimony, however, amounted to little
more than an unsurprising admission that Georgia, long resistant to
the black franchise, may have required pressure to increase the num-
ber of its black congressional districts from the tokenage of one to a
more representative and equitable number. For that matter, the tes-
timony was merely proof of the political adage to which all interest
groups must adhere: if you want something, insist on it. The Court,
however, elected to measure black participation in the two-party
process by an inhibiting set of standards.
149. See id. at 1561.
150. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
151. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (construing section 2).
152. See Johnson IV, 922 F. Supp. at 1566.
153. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1934.
154. See id. at 1934.
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The Court also found Georgia’s two-district plan unconstitu-
tional because the black caucus of the Georgia legislature and the
legislature’s Democratic leadership had arrived at an understanding
in 1991 that there would be at least two black congressional districts.
This understanding, according to the Court, was reached “in the
shadow of the Justice Department’s max-black goal.”155 But there
would be little point in having black legislators in the Georgia As-
sembly and Senate if they did not attempt to advance the unique in-
terests of their constituents, whether in the redistricting process or in
the passage of substantive legislation. Had these legislators remained
silent or been less vigorous in pursuing an increase in black congres-
sional representation, their constituents undoubtedly would have
viewed such passivity as derelict. Moreover, it cannot violate the
Constitution for black legislators to cut deals on behalf of their con-
stituencies unless the Constitution also prohibits white legislators
from doing the same. Given the considerable degree to which racial
prejudice influences white attitudes on the broad range of policy is-
sues that the redistricting process is intended to reflect, the creation
of white districts is no less a racial act than the creation of black
ones.156
155. Id.
156. It is only by treating the creation of white districts as racially transparent, or neutral,
see supra note 81, that one can portray the dealmaking of the black legislators as exceptional.
But given the prevalence of black stereotypes among whites, see supra note 99 and accompa-
nying text, and the distinctly racial genesis of Republican conservatism, see infra note 180, the
assumption of racial neutrality is simply untenable. The policy choices and political preferences
of whites—choices and preferences that the redistricting process attempts to take into ac-
count—are influenced by racial prejudice. Researchers have documented that at least 42% of
white southerners object to living next door to a black family. See James H. Kuklinski et al.,
Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 402, 407 (1997).
While this astonishing level of bigotry cannot alone explain the pervasive white southern oppo-
sition to affirmative action, see id. at 408, researchers do not dispute some causal relationship
between white prejudice and opposition to affirmative action. See id. at 408, 413, 414
(explaining racial prejudice as one source, but not the sole source, of opposition to affirmative
action). See also Donald R. Kinder & Tali Mendelberg, Cracks in American Apartheid: The
Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites, 57 J. POL. 402, 403 (1995) (“[M]any
white Americans continue to harbor emotionally charged derogatory beliefs about blacks
and . . . such beliefs figure prominently in whites’ opposition to policies designed to narrow ra-
cial inequalities.”).
The effects of stereotypes and prejudice are not limited to overtly racial issues like af-
firmative action. White attitudes toward criminal justice policies are substantially influenced by
race. See Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Ra-
cial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 393 (1997) (noting “a substantial and recurrent over-
lap between negative African-American stereotypes and more punitive views of crime policy
among . . . white respondents over a variety of survey experiments”). Similarly, whites’ views
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Even if the Justice Department pressured the Georgia legisla-
ture to create a second black district, its arm-twisting was irrelevant
in assessing that district’s constitutionality. To begin with, there was
ample evidence that this result would have been reached whether or
not the Justice Department had intervened. There were thirty-five
blacks in Georgia’s 236 member legislature, nine of them committee
chairmen.157 Black voters had proven themselves extremely loyal
Democratic voters in Georgia.158 Consequently, maintenance of the
one-black-congressman status quo was politically untenable. The fact
that this constituency was a racial minority asserting its own distinct
interests does not delegitimize its “critical and traditional” input into
the party process.159 Against this backdrop, it was simply conjecture
for the Court to conclude that Justice Department pressure to im-
plement a max-black plan, rather than Democrats’ need to accom-
modate a constituency as powerful as the black community was in
1991, accounted for the passage of the two-district plan. Even if it did,
however, Justice Breyer was surely correct to ask:
How can a court say that a legislative Act is legitimate—that it re-
flects legislative preferences or policies when those who reason or
cajole (or threaten suit) are farmers, businessmen, or consumer
groups, but that the same legislative Act becomes illegitimate—that
it does not reflect ‘true’ legislative policy or preference—simply be-
cause those who seek to persuade (or threaten suit) represent the
Justice Department. [sic] One cannot say that the Department’s
power is any less legitimate than that exercised by the many other
groups that seek to influence legislative decisions; and its employees’
sworn duty to uphold the law would seem more suitably character-
regarding welfare policy are “heavily colored by their racial stereotypes.” Mark Peffley et al.,
Racial Stereotypes and Whites’ Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41
AM. J. POL. SCI. 30, 44 (1997). Racial isolation exacerbates the degree to which prejudice in-
forms whites’ policy preferences, for “[r]acial isolation may leave many white Americans sus-
ceptible to propaganda, rumor, and their own stereotypes . . . .” Kinder & Mendelberg, supra,
at 420. This finding is particularly significant given that nearly half of white Americans report
no blacks living in their neighborhood, and “less than 10% . . . report working with substantial
numbers of blacks.” Id. at 417.
In sum, to the extent that white districts reflect the shared interests of whites, these dis-
tricts are by their very nature racial. Yet, the Court dare not apply a “predominance” test to
white districts to determine whether they are drawn with a racial purpose in mind.
157. See Steve Harvey, State’s Black Caucus at crossroads as it marks 25 years, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Oct. 10, 1992, at B5.
158. See, e.g., Leonard Pallats, Georgia Voters Split Evenly on Parties, CHATTANOOGA
FREE PRESS, Dec. 1, 1996, at C1 (noting strong Democratic voting habits among Georgia’s
blacks).
159. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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ized as a reason for paying greater attention to its views rather than
as a reason for heeding them less.160
Justice Breyer’s dissent rightly skewers the majority for treating
the creation of Georgia’s new black congressional districts as a case
of overzealous administrative enforcement.161 The majority’s depic-
160. Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1945 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. One commentator has agreed with this portrayal of the Justice Department’s activity
in the racial gerrymandering cases, concluding states were “the victims” of DOJ intervention.
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 780 (1998). Professor Lowenstein argues that racial gerryman-
dering cases such as Abrams punish states for capitulating to federal pressure to create major-
ity-minority districts by divesting those states of control over their redistricting once such dis-
tricts are declared unconstitutional because race predominated in their creation. See id. at 783,
816. He maintains that a “genuinely conservative Court,” rather than punishing covered juris-
dictions by derogating from their constitutional prerogative to perform their own redistricting,
would either lessen or eliminate the federal mandate for majority-minority districts. Id. at 826.
Left to the states, majority-minority districts will continue to be created, but “state legislatures,
acting on their own, do not carry race-based districting to excess.” Id. at 828. Thus, instead of
privileging racial minorities by guaranteeing them a floor below which the number of majority-
minority districts may not fall, blacks and Hispanics may “engage freely in the political process
of competition and negotiation.” Id. at 830.
There is, of course, a certain mischief to labeling the State of Georgia a “victim” in the
context of the federal mandates imposed on it under the Voting Rights Act. Georgia’s virulent
history of racial discrimination against blacks at the polls, a history that includes the use of lit-
eracy tests, subjected it to the preclearance requirements of the Act. See supra note 122.
Moreover, the state need not continue to subject itself to preclearance at all, as the Voting
Rights Act allows a jurisdiction to “bail out” upon a showing to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia that, inter alia, “during the ten years preceding the filing of
the action” Georgia has not used a test or device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A) (1994).
Georgia, however, remains subject to preclearance, a fact which is indicative of its continuing
discrimination against minorities. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with Lowenstein’s depiction of the relationship between
the DOJ and the states is its ahistoricism. Like the Court in Abrams, Lowenstein implicitly
denigrates the historical alliances of minorities and the federal government in fighting for civil
rights. See Lowenstein, supra, at 812-16 (portraying the states as victims and pointing to DOJ
inflexibility as a cause of states’ difficulties in redistricting). For more than a century, blacks
have been compelled to seek the aid of the federal government in advancing their civil rights.
The National Equal Rights League lobbied Congress after the Civil War for passage of legisla-
tion conferring on blacks the right to vote. See AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN
AMERICA, 1880–1915, at 6 (1963). And the same Justice Department that the Court so vigor-
ously criticized in Abrams intervened on numerous occasions during the 1960s to ensure the
First Amendment rights and safety of black civil rights activists in the South. See HANES
WALTON, WHEN THE MARCHING STOPPED: THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS REGULATORY
AGENCIES 181 (1988) (discussing the three eras of civil rights enforcement by federal regula-
tory agencies and characterizing the 1960s as a period when “the federal government [was]
forced to step away from the sidelines and take sides with the [civil rights] movement and
against those who used violence and fraud to deny individuals their basic human rights”).
While the cause for which the federal government’s aid is enlisted should not insulate any ac-
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tion makes even less sense when one considers that Georgia at all
times remained free to seek a determination from a three-judge court
regarding whether its 1991 redistricting plan complied with the Vot-
ing Rights Act.162 Thus, if the state ever intended to submit and pre-
clear a plan with fewer than two majority-black districts, it could have
done so, and the Justice Department could not have stood in the way.
It failed to exercise this option, presumably because it had always in-
tended to have at least two black districts. The Court’s exaggerated
view of the Justice Department’s power, however, effectively reduced
the autonomy of Georgia’s legislature and rendered the Democratic
Party of Georgia unaccountable to black voters in the redistricting
process.
The Court’s baffling focus on the role of the DOJ obfuscated the
more fundamental question of the legitimacy of black group identity
politics that lay at the heart of Abrams. The Court’s behavior was es-
pecially curious because Abrams presented the Court with an oppor-
tunity to affirm and elucidate its decision in Romer v. Evans,163 the
case which invalidated Colorado’s proscription against laws prohib-
iting discrimination against homosexuals.164 The Court found that by
prohibiting its legislature or localities from enacting laws to protect
homosexuals, Colorado had rendered it “more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government . . . a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”165 But
if lesbians and gays are entitled to petition their governments for
salutary legislation, does not the Equal Protection Clause allow
blacks to do the same, without fear that their efforts will later be used
against them to show an overemphasis on race? In the context of the
two-party process and one of its core activities—redistricting—
Abrams renders it more difficult for blacks to seek beneficial legisla-
tion from their governments for no other reason than their choice to
identify their political interests through the prism of their race. After
Romer and Abrams, group identity politics is a right of homosexuals
which cannot be exercised by the very group for whom the Four-
teenth Amendment was especially enacted.
tivity from constitutional scrutiny, neither should the fact of government intervention give rise
to constitutional suspicion.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (1994).
163. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
164. See id. at 623-24.
165. Id. at 633.
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The Supreme Court’s scrutiny of the lobbying of black legislators
and their allies wreaks doctrinal havoc when stretched to its logical
boundaries. In Major v. Treen,166 black legislators were intentionally
excluded from a critical meeting during which white legislators re-
vised Louisiana’s congressional districting map.167 The meeting re-
sulted in a plan that contained no majority-black congressional dis-
tricts, despite a compact black population in the city of New Orleans
sufficiently numerous to create such a district.168 A three-judge court
found the whites-only meeting at which the districting plan was cre-
ated to be probative of an intent to dilute black voting strength.169
Under Abrams, however, the exclusion of these black legislators
might be legally inconsequential because even if they or their proxies
attended the meeting, their successful advocacy for a black district
might be proof of an illegal gerrymander to aid black voters.170
Treen is instructive on another score. The state legislators who
attended the whites-only meeting—and the governor who refused to
sign an earlier redistricting plan containing a black district—were all
actors who possessed the power to determine the outcome of the
legislation. Minority legislators in Abrams, even with the backing of
the Justice Department and ACLU, were simply not similarly situ-
ated to these lawmakers who, in the final analysis, controlled the
process of redistricting. White members of the Louisiana state legis-
lature seemed to understand this, even if the Court in Abrams could
not. As one participant in the whites-only meeting discussed in Treen
confessed:
[T]he feeling in the meeting was that the one group, the one
[constituency] group that was not going to come out of the session
satisfied was going to be the blacks. The reason for that was that
with all of the competing interests . . . there was probably going to
be virtually no way to satisfy the black members of the Legisla-
166. 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
167. See id. at 334.
168. See id. at 334-36.
169. See id. at 355 n.39 (declining to draw an inference of intentional discrimination but
considering the totality of the evidence in finding a dilution of the black vote).
170. Under Miller’s predominance test, the black district’s relative compactness would not
preclude a finding of unconstitutionality. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)
(“[P]arties alleging that a State has assigned voters on the basis of race are neither confined in
their proof to evidence regarding the district’s geometry and makeup nor required to make a
threshold showing of bizarreness.”).
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ture . . . insofar as creating a majority black district [was con-
cerned] . . . They [minority legislators] didn’t have enough votes.171
Justice O’Connor, who cast the deciding vote in the 5-4 Abrams
decision, had previously recognized the fundamental distinction be-
tween acts of a majority intended to benefit a politically weaker mi-
nority and acts of a majority that evoke shades of self-dealing.172 In
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, the distinction was a basis
for invalidating a minority contracts set-aside program passed by a
majority-black city council.173 In contrast, Abrams failed to heed this
distinction in invalidating the two-district plans passed by the major-
ity-white Georgia Assembly to benefit black voters who were a mi-
nority within the state. The impression created by the Court is that
when whites are in the minority they will be entitled to greater pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment than blacks will be when
blacks occupy the same position.174
The rule of Abrams presents still another doctrinal paradox. For
nearly three decades, courts have looked to the responsiveness of
white elected officials to determine whether minority voters have
proven vote dilution in violation of either the Constitution175 or the
Voting Rights Act.176 Non-responsiveness or minimal responsiveness
constituted evidence that minorities had less opportunity to partici-
171. 574 F. Supp. at 334 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
172. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (noting that a
majority-black city council’s passage of a contract set-aside program implicated “[t]he concern
that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwar-
ranted assumptions or incomplete facts”).
173. See id. at 511.
174. Justice O’Connor’s selective application of the distinction she recognized in Croson is
a classic illustration of what Professor Derrick Bell has called “interest-convergence”: white
support for black interests when whites stand to benefit. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25
(1980) (discussing the economic and political motives for white support of desegregation).
175. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (holding that a Democratic
nominating organization did not “exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs
and aspirations of the Negro community”); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1973) (including “the unresponsiveness of legislators to their [minorities’] particularized
interests” among the panoply of factors to be considered in determining unconstitutional vote
dilution), aff’d sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per cu-
riam).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994). See also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (stating that
“significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority group” may, in some cases, constitute evidence of vote dilution in
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
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pate in the political process than whites.177 Abrams invites a head-on
collision with traditional vote dilution analysis by employing state ef-
forts to respond to black interests as evidence of a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The inevitable message conveyed to white
government officials is that responsiveness matters less. Worse still,
state and local governments are now placed in the precarious position
of determining how much responsiveness will suffice to mitigate the
claims of vote dilution by racial minorities and how much respon-
siveness will violate the Constitution.178
Some may be inclined to apply a simple test of even-handedness
to the evidentiary problem of minority group advocacy in the redis-
tricting context. Thus, if courts are free to examine the legislative
process for evidence of discriminatory intent in other contexts, as
where whites are accused of invidiously discriminating against mi-
norities, surely it is fair to do the same in cases like Abrams. But the
Court in Abrams dispensed with any pretense of even-handedness by
failing to require that the plaintiffs demonstrate the state’s intent to
harm an identifiable group—normally a threshold requirement for
application of strict scrutiny to facially neutral legislation which al-
legedly violates the Equal Protection Clause.179 Moreover, nothing in
Abrams curtails white participation in the very heart of the two-party
process—redistricting. White voters remain free to call for the crea-
tion of districts that reflect their various interests: conservative dis-
tricts, Christian fundamentalist districts, farming districts. The Court
has never suggested that this kind of activity is constitutionally sus-
pect, though a good argument can be made that many of the ideo-
177. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
178. For an odd twist on this problem, see Debra West, In Mount Vernon, Black Woman is
Rejected for Sake of Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at B1. The city of Mount Vernon,
New York, is predominantly black, and four members of its five-member City Council are
black. The lone white member on the council resigned, and Democratic Party leaders must now
appoint an interim replacement. Fearing a possible suit by white voters calling for the disman-
tling of the city’s at-large, citywide election system—a system which permits a cohesive major-
ity to capture all seats—party officials publicly announced that they were seeking a white to fill
the vacancy. See id. Three blacks seeking the position were told that they were unlikely to re-
ceive it because of their race. See id. Because Mount Vernon has made racial diversity—and
therefore race—a principal criterion in its selection process, it may be sued under Abrams for
its efforts to be responsive to the city’s white community. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
916, 920 (1994) (stating that strict scrutiny is triggered where race is the predominant criterion
for decisionmaking).
179. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1161-67 (1998)
(arguing that, despite the Court’s general recognition of the need for judicial restraint in the
politically-charged realm of redistricting, the Court’s recent racial gerrymandering cases unjus-
tifiably relax the requirement of specific discriminatory intent).
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logical interests that whites are permitted to employ in districting are
rooted in a hostility toward blacks.180 Thus, the constraint on black
advocacy imposed by the Court in Abrams is unique and debilitating.
180. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. This is especially true of Republican con-
servative congressional districts. To a considerable degree, the modern Republican Party, par-
ticularly its southern wing, was born of white resentment of the Democrats’ embrace of civil
rights and black voters. See Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra note 80, at 121-34. Carmines and
Huckfeldt explain that the 1964 presidential election “marked a restructuring of American po-
litical parties around racial issues.” Id. at 121. It was that year that Lyndon Johnson firmly al-
lied the Democratic Party with civil rights and the fortunes of black voters while his Republican
opponent, Barry Goldwater, choose the opposite route. See id. As a consequence, Republi-
cans—who throughout the 1940s and 1950s were more liberal on issues of race than congres-
sional Democrats—dramatically shifted their position and became the party of “white racial
disaffection.” Id. at 121, 130. See also JAMES M. GLASER, RACE, CAMPAIGN POLITICS, AND
THE REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTH 5 (1996):
When the Kennedy and Johnson administrations started to take a more active role in
advancing civil rights in the South and when Barry Goldwater partially based his
presidential campaign in 1964 on his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
polarization of the national parties over race began to set.
Republican political strategists urged their party to exploit whites’ racial alienation from the
Democratic Party. See id. at 6 (noting that Republican political strategist Kevin Phillips
“enthusiastically” urged this tactic). “Today even southern Democrats are less conservative on
matters of race than the Senate Republican party as a whole.” Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra
note 80, at 121.
The alienation of white voters from the Democratic Party just as the party began to em-
brace black civil rights has led to a racial polarity in the American two-party structure that
transcends class:
What are the political consequences of the Democratic party’s reliance on black vot-
ers? White voters are frequently unwilling to support a party that depends heavily
upon black support, and the decline in white support for Democratic presidential
candidates has been most pronounced among working-class whites. Thus class differ-
ences in party support among whites have narrowed as racial differences have in-
creased . . . . [T]he mobilization of blacks by the Democratic party has fundamentally
altered its status as the working-class party in American politics. And at least in this
regard, the New Deal party system has been significantly transformed.
Id. at 130.
Even scholars who contend that race in its explicit form has disappeared as a partisan is-
sue concede that it continues to be intertwined with a more general ideological divide between
Republicans and Democrats and that the voting patterns created by explicitly racial issues be-
ginning in 1964 have not disappeared. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 73. See also Kevin Sack,
South’s Embrace of G.O.P. is Near a Turning Point, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at A1 (noting
that a rejection of the Democratic Party’s positions on both economics and race have resulted
in Republican gains in the South). Thus, courts should not presume racial neutrality in the crea-
tion of Republican conservative districts. Not only does the majority party in such districts tend
to be racially homogeneous, see B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Political Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 1998, at A16 (noting only 1 in every 10 blacks identifies himself as a Republican), but it also
promotes a set of issues which have an explicitly racial genesis and a disparate racial impact.
See, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR 208 (1996)
(“[D]ifferences between the parties on race set in motion by the events of 1964 have, if any-
thing, hardened over the succeeding years.”); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Dis-
crimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 68 (1995) (characterizing opposition to affirmative action, a stan-
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This constraint, moreover, is entirely unnecessary to the Court’s
stated objective in its wrongful gerrymandering cases, which is to
“mak[e] extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful
judicial review.”181 But how extreme could the gerrymandering in
Georgia have been if, as the majority in Miller conceded, “by com-
parison with other districts the geometric shape of the Eleventh Dis-
trict may not seem bizarre on its face”?182 In the absence of a more
coherent measurement rooted in the realities of the redistricting
process and the goal of two-party stability, the Court’s inquiry into
the predominant purpose of the legislature’s redistricting was simply
one step further into the “political thicket.” But, as will be shown
below, the Court’s journey from max-black to min-black may be
more harmful to the two-party political process as a whole than help-
ful to the plaintiffs who sought the remedy of eliminating the major-
ity-black districts in Georgia. That harm is inextricably linked to the
Court’s misconceptualization of the plaintiffs’ injury in the racial ger-
rymandering cases.
III. THE DEFERENCE-INJURY NEXUS: A BLACK APOSTASY OF THE
TWO-PARTY PARADIGM?
Courts have long grappled with the problem of the “political
thicket” and have been vexed by the inconsistent outcomes that have
ensued from judicial regulation of the electoral process.183 The initial
constraint on judicial intervention, the political question doctrine, has
long ago faded into irrelevance in matters affecting the fundamental
right to vote.184 Thus, the Court has recognized the justiciability of
dard conservative position, as “a form of perpetuated racial discrimination because opponents
are willing to freeze the illegitimate gains that whites have made over minorities as a result of
past racial discrimination”).
181. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 917.
183. Compare Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (finding that an
alliance of Republicans and independent voters did not threaten political stability), with Tim-
mons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997) (concluding that an alliance of the
New Party and Democrats was harmful to the state’s interest in political stability); compare
also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973) (finding racial vote dilution where an at-
large system of elections existed in conjunction with other discriminatory electoral devices and
a pervasive history of racial discrimination in Texas), with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 69-74 (1980) (finding no dilution despite the existence of many of the same factors found to
be sufficient in White).
184. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986) (reviewing the Court’s
treatment of the political question doctrine in cases involving the right to vote and concluding
that the doctrine did not apply to Indiana Democrats’ claim of excessive partisan gerryman-
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claims involving the exclusion of racial minorities from party prima-
ries,185 population inequality in apportionment,186 and minority and
partisan vote dilution.187 These cases had two characteristics in com-
mon. First, they involved an alleged injury to voting. Second, the
remedy in each was circumscribed so as not to disturb two-party sta-
bility and the model of party participation that Justice O’Connor pre-
sented in Davis.188 Abrams—which had neither of these two fea-
tures—suggests a relationship between them. Where the Court is not
limited to remedying an injury to voting, its decisions are more likely
to unsettle two-party stability; in the absence of a tangible harm, it
cannot rationally gauge the amount of deference that should be ac-
corded state legislatures’ political judgments.
This consequence flows from the ingrained two-party bias of our
political system. Even where a state’s interest in two-party politics is
not directly at issue in a case, it is almost always implicated. Political
participation does not occur in an abstract vacuum but rather in the
two-party system that the states have been allowed to perpetuate.
Thus, the failure to defer to state legislative choices in the redistrict-
ing realm—choices which are presumptively consistent with two-
party politics—may not only defeat the particular redistricting plan at
issue but may also harm the underlying two-party process. Given the
omnipresent state interest in two-party political stability, this Part
asks whether the lack of deference in Abrams was a function of the
intangible nature of the injury alleged by the plaintiffs and whether
there was a corresponding harm to the two-party process. This in-
quiry requires, first, a more detailed examination of the nature of the
injury claimed by the plaintiffs in Abrams compared to the injuries of
other plaintiffs on whose behalf the Court has intervened and, sec-
ond, an evaluation of how the Court’s indulgence of the plaintiffs
might threaten two-party stability.
dering). The political question doctrine, which is driven by separation of powers concerns, re-
quires that federal courts abstain from hearing a case in a variety of circumstances which would
unduly stretch their institutional competence, such as where resolution of the issue is expressly
committed to another branch of the government. See id. at 121.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 206-208.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 209-211; Davis, 478 U.S. 109.
188. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 144-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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A. Abrams: What Kind of Injury? What Kind of Equality?
Although the Abrams opinion did not identify the injury to the
plaintiffs who objected to the Georgia redistricting that would have
created three black districts, it implicitly reaffirmed the Miller
Court’s view that “[w]hen the State assigns voters on the basis of
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that vot-
ers of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.’”189 Miller, in turn, was a reaffirmation of the Court’s logic in its
landmark reverse-racial gerrymandering decision, Shaw v. Reno.190
Shaw explained that the harms of race-based districting include its re-
semblance to apartheid, its perpetuation of racial stereotypes, its po-
tential to create racial hostility and exacerbate racial bloc voting, and
its implicit message to elected officials that they should represent
only the interests of the racial group for whom a district has been
created.191 In United States v. Hays,192 Justice O’Connor termed these
injuries “special representational harms.”193
The harms that the Court attributed to majority-minority dis-
tricts such as Georgia’s Second and Eleventh can be substantiated by
neither the casual nor the close observer. To the extent such districts
stereotyped voters, these voters were free to break the mold by vot-
ing contrary to the government’s allegedly stereotypical expectations.
Any resemblance these districts had to apartheid was belied by the
fact that they were two of the most integrated districts in the coun-
try,194 and the resulting election of two additional black representa-
tives made Georgia’s congressional delegation more, not less, repre-
sentative of Georgia’s population.195 If such districts created racial
189. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
647 (1993)).
190. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
191. See id. at 647-48.
192. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
193. Id. at 745.
194. The Second District was 42% white, while the Eleventh was 34% white. See REEVES,
supra note 28, at 96. See also McDonald, supra note 28, at 139 (noting that majority-minority
congressional districts in the South are among the most integrated in the country, containing an
average white population of 45%).
195. Blacks constitute approximately 28% of Georgia’s population. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT supra note 102, at 34. After Abrams, which left only one majority-black congres-
sional district, blacks hold majority status in only 9% of the state’s 11 congressional districts.
Prior to Abrams, during which three black-majority districts existed, blacks had achieved rough
parity with their population numbers, controlling 27% of the state’s congressional districts.
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hostility—a prediction for which the Court provided no empirical
support—one must ask whether that hostility is simply the expected
anger of whites when they are placed in the unaccustomed position of
sharing power with racial minorities.196 This may be an injury of sorts,
but, far from recognizing such a harm, the Constitution protects un-
popular minorities from the irrational hostility of a majority.197
As for the notion that the Second and Eleventh Districts would
exacerbate racial bloc voting—another unsupported assertion by the
Court—the purpose of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is to ad-
dress this very phenomenon where it unfairly disadvantages minority
voters. Because the Court has stressed that a Shaw/Abrams claim that
a “reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to segregate citizens . . .” is “analytically distinct”
from a vote dilution claim,198 its argument becomes fatally boot-
strapped when it adverts to racial bloc voting—an element of a vote
dilution claim—as the injury from which it is seeking to protect plain-
196. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 372 (1987) (arguing that “whites are not
accustomed to seeing blacks in positions of authority or power,” and that blacks’ historical ex-
clusion from such positions has been “rationalized” by the stereotype that they are not suited
for these roles).
Indeed, the inevitable result of recognizing a claim of the Shaw/Abrams variety is the
whetting of appetites for white racial dominion of the political process. After the Supreme
Court struck down North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District as an unconstitutional ra-
cial gerrymander in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), the North Carolina General Assembly
redrew the district, reducing its black voting-age population to only 43%. See Cromartie v.
Hunt, No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7767, at *8 n.2 (E.D.N.C. April 14,
1998), probable juris. noted, 1998 WL 407142, *1 (U.S.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998). Voters in the
Twelfth District nevertheless again challenged its composition as an unconstitutional racial ger-
rymander. A three-judge panel, with Circuit Judge Ervin dissenting, sustained this challenge
because the new district continued to be “unusually shaped,” id. at *25, and because North
Carolina appeared in certain precincts to maximize the number of black voters rather than the
number of registered Democrats. See id. at *28. Judge Ervin, however, aptly observed:
While this may not be dispositive of the question whether race was the predominant
factor in the legislature’s redistricting plan, the fact that all of North Carolina’s con-
gressional districts are majority-white at the very least makes the Plaintiffs’ burden,
which is already quite high, even more onerous. Had the legislature been predomi-
nantly influenced by a desire to draw District 12 according to race, I suspect it would
have created a district where more than 43% of the voting-age population was black.
Id. at *38 (Ervin, J., dissenting). If the Supreme Court sustains the result in Cromartie, the
Shaw/Abrams doctrine will almost certainly become an invitation to a new “lily-whitism” in
American politics.
197. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (striking
down a special permit requirement for maintenance of a home for the mentally retarded be-
cause the requirement rested on “irrational prejudice”).
198. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993).
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tiffs. In any event, given that voters in majority-minority districts are
more willing to support white candidates than are voters in majority-
white districts to support minorities,199 it seems utterly perverse to
suggest that districts in which blacks are a voting majority will fan ra-
cial bloc voting but districts in which whites are in the majority will
not. Finally, the Court’s concern that members elected from major-
ity-black districts will feel loyalty only to their black constituents di-
rectly contradicts its embrace of formal equality in Davis, where it
maintained that “[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes
for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented
by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influ-
ence that candidate as other voters in the district.”200
Given the notable vagueness of the claims raised by the
Shaw/Abrams plaintiffs, it is unsurprising that commentators have
questioned whether such plaintiffs meet Article III’s standing re-
quirement of an injury-in-fact.201 But the ethereal nature of the injury
claimed by the Abrams plaintiffs poses another problem for courts:
since there is no way to be clear about the nature of the injury, courts
cannot be clear about what kind of equality interests judicial inter-
vention will serve. Consequently, they are also unable to rationally
situate these claims within the established party structures that states
have been permitted to favor.
The Abrams plaintiffs did not state a claim of protective democ-
racy; unlike the plaintiffs in Davis, these plaintiffs did not claim that
they possessed inadequate political influence.202 Nor were they seek-
ing formal equality of the “one person, one vote” sort, since they pos-
sessed unfettered access to the polls and to participation in the politi-
199. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 139-41 (comparing levels of white success in black
districts with white voting for minority candidates in white districts). McDonald concludes:
The voting trends in Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi [states which had created
black congressional districts under the Voting Rights Act] undermine the argument
that highly integrated majority-minority districts have increased polarization. To the
contrary, they hold out the promise, perhaps for the first time in the South’s troubled
history, of meaningful biracial politics.
Id. at 140-41 (footnotes omitted). However, McDonald also observes increases in the willing-
ness of white voters in majority-minority districts to support minority candidates. See id. at 140.
200. 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
201. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287,
294-95 (1996) (noting that “all three prongs of the traditional standing inquiry pose problems
for wrongful districting claims”); Melvyn R. Durchslag, United States v. Hays: An Essay On
Standing To Challenge Majority-Minority Voting Districts, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 341, 356-59
(1997).
202. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing claims of protective democracy).
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cal process. Instead, the Abrams plaintiffs succeeded in persuading
the Court to disturb formal equality by making it more difficult for
blacks to exert influence on the redistricting process than it is for
other groups to do so. Thus, the minimal equality that the Court
seemed to guarantee in Davis—the “chance to effectively influence
the political process”203—was withheld from black voters in Georgia.
But where groups do not enjoy this minimal equality, what is their in-
centive to participate in the two-party process? While past judicial
experience had been limited to claims that required a balancing of
substantive and formal equality, Abrams involved the elimination of
both. Some discussion of the Court’s earlier ballot box cases will be
helpful.
Prior to Shaw, an injury to voting was a necessary, though per-
haps not always sufficient, pre-condition to obtaining a remedy for
state action affecting the electoral process. In the white primary
cases,204 black plaintiffs complained that they were excluded on the
basis of race from participating in critical portions of the candidate
selection process. Rejecting arguments that private organizations
rather than the state were responsible for the processes at issue, the
Court ultimately sustained the plaintiffs’ persistent challenges be-
cause the private mechanism for choosing candidates had become an
integral part of the state electoral process.205 The plaintiffs in Abrams
and its forerunners did not allege exclusion from the electoral process
on the basis of race.
203. Davis v. Bandemer, 78 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
204. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that Texas’s blanket prohibition
against Negro participation in the Democratic Party primary violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932) (rejecting Texas’s attempt to avoid the stric-
tures of the Fourteenth Amendment by delegating the authority to determine qualifications for
participating in party primaries to a State Executive Committee because such Committees be-
come “the organs of the State itself, the repositories of official power”); Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45, 53 (1935) (finding no state action, and hence no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, where a Negro voter was excluded from a Texas Democratic primary based on
resolution of Democratic Party Convention of Texas permitting only white citizens to partici-
pate in party primaries); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944) (overruling Grovey
and holding that political parties act as state agencies when they follow statutory mandates to
select party nominees for the general election); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463, 469 (1953)
(finding unlawful state exclusion of Negroes from the Jaybird Democratic Party, a nominally
private association, where that party’s primary almost invariably dictated the winner of the
regular Democratic primary).
205. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
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In Reynolds v. Sims,206 the Court held that states’ malapportion-
ment affording greater representation to sparsely populated rural ar-
eas than to more populous urban and suburban districts violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit command of “one person, one
vote.”207 The Court wrote:
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of
the State should be given two times, or five times, or [ten] times the
weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.208
The plaintiffs in Abrams and its forerunners did not allege, nor could
they have proved, quantitative vote dilution.
Reynolds provided the theoretical framework for another type of
vote dilution claim, racial vote dilution. In this category of cases,
black plaintiffs claimed that at-large electoral structures combined
with racial bloc voting and other demographic and social disadvan-
tages to effectively minimize or cancel out their voting potential.209
The Court has provided a constitutional remedy in such cases where
plaintiffs have demonstrated that “the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by
the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the political proc-
esses and to elect legislators of their choice.”210 In Abrams and its
forerunners, such as Shaw, the plaintiffs conceded that they could not
make out a claim of racial vote dilution, for each of the redistricting
206. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
207. See id. at 568.
208. Id. at 562.
209. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (rejecting an equal protection chal-
lenge to at-large elections because plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that their votes were
canceled out or diluted on account of race rather than political affiliation); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (sustaining a constitutional challenge to at-large elections upon finding
that the processes of nominating and electing legislators were not fully open to the group in
question such that it was unable to exert the political influence that its numbers suggested it
had); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (imposing a discrimi-
natory intent requirement on Fourteenth Amendment challenges to at-large electoral systems);
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 620-22 (1982) (upholding district court’s determination that al-
though at-large system was not created with a discriminatory purpose, it was maintained with
such a purpose and thus violated the Constitution).
210. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
149 (1971)).
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plans challenged in these cases left whites overrepresented in relation
to their statewide populations.211
Cases involving political gerrymanders,212 ballot access restric-
tions,213 and assorted restrictions on the exercise of the franchise214
have all similarly involved an alleged injury to voting. Thus,
Shaw/Abrams claims are clearly in a category of their own. This dis-
tinction, in and of itself, does not detract from the validity of Abrams
if one believes that racial stereotyping is a harm distinct from im-
pediments to the right to vote. However, equal protection analysis of
fundamental rights recognizes substantial infringements on the right
to vote as being at least as serious as the stereotyping identified in
Shaw215—yet the remedies afforded Shaw/Abrams plaintiffs are much
more deferential than those afforded plaintiffs in cases involving an
actual injury to voting. More specifically, the remedies in the latter
cases have tended to be circumscribed so as to preserve the states’ in-
terest in two-party political stability while the same is not true of
Abrams and its kin.
The remedy in the white primary cases was to open up the politi-
cal processes to blacks.216 While this undoubtedly caused some white
southerners to move from the Democratic Party to the more racially
conservative217 Republican Party, the remedy could hardly be said to
211. The Court in Shaw went to great lengths to distinguish the facts of the case before it
from cases involving vote dilution. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993)
(distinguishing United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)). But
this effort only underscores the fact that prior to Shaw the Court had always required an injury
to voting in cases involving state regulation of the electoral process.
212. See e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
213. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 26 (1974) (involving disenfranchisement
of convicted felons); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969)
(involving restrictions on the right to vote in school board elections).
215. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to state
residence durational requirements limiting the franchise); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972) (holding that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of legislative classifica-
tions which interfere with the right to vote). Although subsequent decisions have shifted the
Court’s focus from the traditional trinity of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational
basis review to a more flexible “undue burden” approach, severe restrictions on the right to
vote continue to be strictly scrutinized. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The
Role Of Undue Burden Analysis In Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 917-20
(1994).
216. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (invalidating whites-only primary elec-
tions).
217. This Article employs the terms “racially conservative” or “racial conservative” to refer
to whites who, consciously or unconsciously, are resistant to black equality and who therefore
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harm two-party stability. The remedy in equal population cases such
as Reynolds v. Sims has been to ensure population equality to the ex-
tent practicable, a result not on its face inconsistent with the vibrancy
of states’ two-party systems.218 The dismantling of at-large voting sys-
tems that is the most common remedy in racial vote dilution cases
aids two-party stability since “[t]he very essence of districting is to
produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—result than would be
reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats.”219 Indeed, except in cases where
the rights of political parties or independent candidates have been at
issue,220 none of the remedies afforded in cases involving an actual
injury to voting has had a direct effect on the states’ interest in main-
taining two-party stability.221 Moreover, even in those cases involving
minor political parties or independent candidates, cases which di-
support policies which have the effect of grandfathering historical white privilege while im-
peding black progress.
218. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (stating that population deviations in
congressional apportionment may be permissible in order to “avoid[] contests between incum-
bent Representatives”). The protection of incumbents, the overwhelming majority of whom
belong to the two major parties, is a central means of protecting two-party stability. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
219. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). The ongoing debate over the extent to
which black districts harm the Democratic Party by taking black voters out of the districts of
moderate white Democrats is obviously relevant to, and perhaps detracts somewhat from, this
proposition. But there is a difference between a remedy that changes the racial composition of
a state’s representatives, which the creation of black districts may do, and one which encour-
ages a group’s abandonment of the two-party process, which the failure to create black districts
may do.
220. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 801 (1983) (invalidating Ohio’s early
filing deadline for independent candidates where the state’s “asserted interest in political sta-
bility amount[ed] to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition . . . generated
by independent candidates who have previously been affiliated with the party”); William v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968) (sustaining an equal protection challenge to Ohio laws that ren-
dered it “virtually impossible” for minor parties to gain access to the state ballot for selection
of electors pledged to presidential candidates).
221. The Supreme Court’s treatment of political patronage is not to the contrary. Although
it does not involve voting per se, conditioning public employment on one’s political affiliations
“prevents support of competing political interests [and] thus tips the electoral process in favor
of the incumbent party. . . .” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976). Even when the Court has
outlawed such practices, it has stated:
[W]e are not persuaded that the elimination of patronage practice . . . will bring
about the demise of party politics. Political parties existed in the absence of active
patronage practice prior to the administration of Andrew Jackson, and they have
survived substantial reduction in their patronage power through the establishment of
merit systems.
Id. at 369.
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rectly challenge the two-party paradigm, the Court has consistently
recognized this interest.222
Admittedly, the interest in two-party stability has not been as-
serted in all cases involving an actual injury to the right to vote. From
the standpoint of doctrinal coherency, however, the important ques-
tion is whether the goals that one decision purports to facilitate can
rationally coexist with the objectives of other decisions. Thus,
whether or not two-party stability is asserted as a state interest in a
given case, once the Court recognizes it as a significant interest—as it
recently did in Timmons223—other decisions should not needlessly
conflict with that interest. The Court has been able to intervene in
the political process in cases involving actual injuries to voting with-
out uprooting two-party stability because the injury requirement it-
self has limited the enterprise in which the Court has engaged.
Abrams, however, contains no such limitation and actually encour-
ages exit from the two-party system by the same racial minorities
whose participation would achieve the integrationist goals to which
the Court purportedly aspires.
B. A Remedy at What Price?: Racial Splintering of the Two-Party
Process
To understand more fully how Abrams effectively discourages
blacks from participating in the two-party system, one must appreci-
ate how they have functioned in that system in the past. Blacks have
historically functioned as a party within a party. Even during the era
of limited black enfranchisement, blacks formed “satellite” or
“parallel” parties to advance their interests within the two-party
structure. These groups “revolve[] in the orbit of a major political
party on the national level and run[] parallel with the state party to
modify the practices of the regular party in light of their own goals
and objectives.”224 To counteract the movement of southern Republi-
cans to “lily-whitism” after the first Reconstruction, blacks formed a
parallel party known as the Black and Tan Republicans.225 While sev-
222. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. See also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1374 (1997) (“The Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature
to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system.”).
223. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374.
224. WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 80-81.
225. See id. at 64. A number of separate, pre-existing parties based in several states united
under one umbrella to form the Black and Tan Republicans. See id.
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eral presidents, including Theodore Roosevelt and Warren G.
Harding, sought the support of the Black and Tan Republicans in se-
curing party nominations, none was responsive to the Black and
Tans’ political agenda.226 Similar parallel parties existed within the
Democratic Party. The South Carolina Progressive Democratic Party
was a satellite partisan group formed by blacks in 1944, as blacks na-
tionally were shifting their collective allegiance away from the party
of Lincoln.227 The group’s aims were to help reelect “Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to a fourth term and to abolish the state’s white pri-
mary,”228 which effectively excluded blacks from voting in that one-
party state.229 The Progressive Democrats were forerunners of what is
perhaps the best known parallel party, the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party.230 The Freedom Democrats challenged the segre-
gated Mississippi delegation’s credentials at the 1964 Democratic Na-
tional Convention, showcasing the need for voting rights legislation
and speeding passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.231
The Voting Rights Act’s prohibition against vote dilution, ban
on literacy tests, preclearance procedures for covered jurisdictions,
and other enforcement mechanisms produced revolutionary change
in the composition of the nation’s electorate and legislative bodies.
Between 1964 and 1988, the percentage of voting-age blacks regis-
tered to vote in the eleven southern states increased from 43.3% to
65.2%.232 Black registration in the five states of the Deep South rose
from 22.5% to approximately 65.2%.233 The number of black elected
226. See id. at 65.
227. See id. at 70.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 80-81.
231. See id. at 92. Perhaps no moment of the 1964 Democratic convention was more mov-
ing or memorable than the testimony of Fannie Lou Hamer, a Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party member and a former plantation timekeeper, before the credentials committee. After
testifying at length on national television about violent resistance to her party’s efforts to regis-
ter voters in Mississippi, Hamer concluded:
All of this is on account we want to register, to become first-class citizens, and if the
Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America, is this America,
the land of the free and the home of the brave where we have to sleep with our tele-
phones off the hooks because our lives be threatened daily because we want to live
as decent human beings, in America?
KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER 120-21 (1993).
232. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 43 (Bernard Grofman et al.
eds., 1992).
233. See id.
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officials in the seven jurisdictions originally covered under the Act’s
preclearance provisions rose from 100 in 1965 to 3,265 in 1989.234 In
the round of redistricting that produced the disputed districts in
Abrams, states attempting to comply with the strictures of the Voting
Rights Act created new majority-black districts in Florida (three),
Georgia, North Carolina, Texas (two each), Alabama, Louisiana,
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia
(one each).235 Thus, during the three decades between the passage of
the Voting Rights Act and the decision in Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme
Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence had evolved in a manner that al-
lowed the Democratic Party to accommodate black voters’ interest in
sharing power. Where racial bloc voting denied black voters the
equal opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice, the federal
judiciary could legitimately intervene to order a remedy, most often
majority-minority districts, on their behalf.236 The Court appeared to
recognize, however, that the voluntary creation of a majority-
minority district occasioned no federal intervention because a test
based on a district’s racial identity would subject all state districting
decisions to judicial interference.237
In overwhelming numbers, black voters and elected officials
made the Democratic Party their political home.238 To be sure, the
marriage between blacks and Democrats is hardly perfect. As black
support for the Democrats has increased, white support has eroded,
putting Democrats at risk of becoming the party of blacks and white
liberals—a coalition usually not large enough to prevail in a state or
234. See id.
235. See Frank R. Parker, Shaw v. Reno: A Constitutional Setback for Minority Representa-
tion, PS: POL. SCI. & POL., Mar. 1995, at 47, 49 n.1.
236. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy,
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 266-68 (discussing the Court’s emphasis on bloc voting as one of three
preconditions of a vote dilution inquiry under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
237. See id. at 268. Karlan argues that the Court’s pre-Shaw decisions appear to appreciate
that:
[A]ll districts have a racial identity, at least in the sense that their racial composition
can be readily described and readily perceived by any politically knowledgeable ob-
server. Thus, it is impossible to say that states must have a justification for con-
sciously drawing racially identifiable districts without subjecting every state district-
ing choice to federal review.
Id.
238. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 180, at 208, 213 fig.8.2 (noting that in 1964 blacks
moved almost unanimously to the Democratic party and that in the 1992 presidential election
they gave nearly 90% of their votes to the Democratic candidate).
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national election.239 Fearful of this prospect, Democratic leaders, of-
ten to the consternation of blacks, have attempted to move the party
closer to the Republicans and to project an image that belies black
control or ultra-liberalism.240 Indeed, black and white Democrats
have split over whether the creation of majority-minority districts
helps or hurts the Democratic Party.241 Notwithstanding such dis-
putes, however, prior to the Shaw/Abrams line of authority, the
Court’s voting rights cases gave the Democratic Party leeway to ac-
commodate the electoral aspirations of its black constituents if it
wished to do so. This may help to explain why calls for the formation
of a black third party did not take hold during the post-Voting Rights
Act, pre-Shaw/Abrams period. Blacks were, for the first time since
Reconstruction, sharing political power within a major party, and
239. See Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra note 80, at 132-33.
240. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 180, at 208 (noting that President Clinton, in his
1992 campaign, attempted to project a moderate image by demonstrating interest in welfare
reform and crime control); see also TOM WICKER, TRAGIC FAILURE: RACIAL INTEGRATION IN
AMERICA 52-53 (1996) (arguing that the conservative takeover of the Republican Party in 1964
and George Wallace’s two presidential campaigns have not only transformed the Republican
Party but have also forced the Democratic Party “to the right”).
That Democrats are self-conscious about being viewed as a black party is revealed by
two recent, publicly embarrassing incidents. In Florida, Democrats in the state House of Rep-
resentatives made history by selecting a black, Willie F. Logan, to be chairman of their caucus.
See Mireya Navarro, Democrats’ Vote Opens a Racial Rift in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998,
at A14. Their vote placed Logan in line to become Speaker if the party regained control of the
House. However, before that promotion would ever come to fruition, the Democratic Caucus
replaced Logan with a white woman. While Democrats maintained that Logan was replaced
because he was an ineffective fundraiser, Logan and other black legislators suspected that
Florida Democrats simply were not prepared for a black party leader. See id. The controversy
has sent an already beleaguered Florida Democratic Party into a tailspin, but tellingly, “[t]he
party erosion and the racial tensions are endemic in the South, where Republicans have gained
ground among whites and Democrats have become increasingly dependent on blacks.” Id.
In Illinois, Roland Burris, also black, appeared to be headed to victory in the Democratic
gubernatorial primary. See Pam Belluck, A Front-Runner Fades and Some See Race Playing a
Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A13. But Burris’ lead began to fade in the midst of calls
that he withdraw from the race in order to make the Democratic ticket more racially balanced.
If Burris won the Democratic nomination he would likely head a ticket that included United
States Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, a black woman, and possibly Jesse White, also black, who
was seeking the Democratic nomination for secretary of state. See id. Burris lost the primary.
241. See Steven A. Holmes, For Very Strange Bedfellows, Try Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1995, at A16 (reporting that Democrats want to limit majority-minority districts on the
theory that these districts siphon off black voters from moderate white Democratic districts,
throwing elections to the Republicans); see also Mark Sherman, Diluting Black Votes for a
Stronger Voice, Politicians Debate Impact of Remap, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 17, 1995, at
3G (noting that many black Democrats favor concentrating blacks in a few districts to help
elect more minorities, while white Democrats favor spreading minorities in order to spread
their influence).
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majority-minority districts had facilitated their integration into the
two-party mainstream.
Let us return for a moment to the hypothetical involving a deal
between Georgia Democrats and the New Black and Tan Party to
allocate three congressional seats to the latter. It should be apparent
that actual black Georgians registered as Democrats who seek a
similar deal with their party are effectively acting as a satellite party.
But a strict application of the Court’s distinction between political
and racial gerrymandering would require black Georgians to identify
themselves separately from the Democratic Party in order to receive
the same fruits as the New Black and Tan Party. This creates a per-
verse and unintended incentive for racial minorities to exit the two-
party system—a system which, the Court has held, states have an im-
portant interest in maintaining.
Concededly, the Court could simply treat any alliance between
the New Black and Tan Party and the Democrats as impermissibly
race-based. The argument would be that a party composed primarily
of blacks and identifying its interests primarily with reference to the
historical oppression of blacks is, for all intents and purposes, not a
political but a racial party. This crude view of race, however, is
fraught with analytical deficiencies. Principal among them is the fail-
ure to recognize the distinction between a majority-black district, to
which voters are assigned, and a majority-black party, with which
voters voluntarily choose to affiliate. There can be no stigmatic injury
to members of the New Black and Tan Party who constitute a major-
ity in a congressional district created as a result of their party’s alli-
ance with Democrats; these voters voluntarily chose to associate with
the New Black and Tans in the first place. And the remaining voters
in such a congressional district—the “minority”—can no more claim
constitutional harm than could the out-numbered Democrats in
Davis; they would simply have received the short end of the stick
(formal equality) in a model of party participation that assumes
someone must.242
Dubbing the New Black and Tan Party a racial party would also
leave the impression that the Court is in the business of content con-
trol. The Court would be forced to demonstrate that political inter-
ests founded on a common history of oppression should be subject to
greater scrutiny than political interests based on, say, religious con-
servatism or opposition to affirmative action or busing. This exercise
242. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing Davis).
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
56 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1
would place the Court in the presumptuous role of substituting its
characterization of a group’s political interests for that of the group.
Yet, citing First Amendment concerns, the Court has held that “a
State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment
for that of the Party.”243
Finally, to deem the New Black and Tan Party a racial party be-
cause of its membership’s racial homogeneity would be to cast a
similar aspersion on the Republican Party, which is overwhelmingly
white, and the Democratic Party in parts of the South, which is in-
creasingly black.244 Thus, the Court might reject the New Black and
Tan Party as a political party, but in so doing, it would lay bare a set
of ahistorical, paternalistic assumptions about politics that could not
be applied consistently to other interest groups or political parties.
Although influencing the redistricting process is not the sole rea-
son for affiliating with a major party, it is an important one. As Jus-
tice O’Connor put it, “[t]he opportunity to control the drawing of
243. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24
(1981) (invalidating Wisconsin’s rule that allowed people who were not members of the Demo-
cratic Party to select delegates to the Democratic National Convention, contrary to the national
party’s rules). Notably, the Court in LaFollette stated:
A political party’s choice among the various ways of determining the makeup of a
State’s delegation to the party’s national convention is protected by the Constitution.
And as is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not
interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.
Id. at 124 (footnotes omitted). While a First Amendment analysis of the Court’s reverse-racial
gerrymandering cases is beyond the scope of this Article, it would appear that the principles
announced in LaFollette apply equally to political parties’ determinations regarding diversity
among their elected representatives. See James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott’s Unwon Freedom:
The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 HOW. L.J. 633, 687 (1996). Blacksher argues:
Just as the right of association of members of a political party is a basic constitutional
freedom and . . . governmental actions that may have the effect of curtailing freedom
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny, so too should the First Amendment pro-
tect the right of black citizens to free political association. Strict judicial scrutiny
should be satisfied if the state shows that its race-conscious districting schemes or
other electoral structures are the product of genuine negotiations between authentic
representatives of the black and nonblack communities.
Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). Cf. Mary T. Boyle, Note, Affirmative Action in
the Democratic Party: An Analysis of the Equal Division Rule, 7 J.L. & POL. 559, 585-86 (1991)
(criticizing the Democratic Party’s “equal division” rule, providing for equal numbers of male
and female delegates to the Democratic National Convention, because the rule has failed to
increase the number of female elected officials).
244. See Grann, supra note 108, at 14 (noting the extreme racial segregation of the major
parties). Indeed, on this view of it, a state would be prohibited from affording the New Black
and Tan Party a place on the ballot, since state action conferring such a right would be imper-
missibly race-based and would presumably give rise to the representational harms that Abrams
is intended to prevent. For a discussion of the inconsistency of such a prohibition with the pre-
cepts of liberal democracy, see infra notes 262-265 and accompanying text.
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electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment
is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States, and
one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the po-
litical parties at every level.”245 Thus, it is unsurprising that one of the
principal motivations for past black efforts to form independent third
parties has been the refusal of the major parties to share in the allo-
cation of representational power.246
Unlike satellite parties, independent parties are not affiliated
with either of the two major parties; they instead seek to successfully
compete against them.247 Post-emancipation black involvement with
independent third parties can be traced to the Compromise of 1877,
in which President Rutherford B. Hayes agreed to withdraw most
federal troops from the South, leaving former slaves vulnerable to
restoration of “home rule” by vengeful white southerners.248 Because
neither the Democrats nor the Republicans embraced black partici-
pation at this time, blacks sought allies within the Populist move-
ment.249 In several states, these alliances aided the reelection of blacks
who had originally secured their seats during Reconstruction.250 How-
ever, these coalitions collapsed under the weight of Populist dema-
gogues’ efforts to further disenfranchise blacks.251 Black efforts to
participate in national party politics were largely abandoned until
1900.252
If there are recurring themes in black third party movements—
whether independent or satellite—they are that black representation
matters to blacks, and that the inability to achieve this end within the
245. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
246. See Kathryn Flewellen, The National Black Independent Political Party: Will History
Repeat?, in 21 FREEDOMWAYS 93, 94 (1981) (noting that “the failure of most white-led political
formations (whether Democrat, Republican, right-wing, liberal or left) to demonstrate a will-
ingness to share power with Blacks” has been one of the “overriding circumstances” giving rise
to black independent political movements).
247. See WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 183-87.
248. See id. at 48.
249. See id. at 50.
250. See id.
251. See id. Populists, like other third parties of this period, exploited the Negro as a scape-
goat for the party’s failings at the polls. See id. at 35. Walton writes: “[I]f the minor party lost,
as was generally the case, Negro suffrage was vigorously denounced; the Negro was accused of
being a corrupting element and an obstacle to progressive reforms.” Id.
252. See id. at 50-51.
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two-party system fuels an impulse to work outside of it.253 Thus,
James E. Clyburn (now a Democratic Congressman) formed the
United Citizens’ Party in 1969 because white South Carolina Demo-
crats had not rewarded black support of the party by electing blacks
to the state legislature.254 Blacks in Alabama have experimented with
at least two independent parties, the Lowndes County Freedom Or-
ganization and the National Democratic Party of Alabama. The latter
met with initial success on the county level, sweeping the elective of-
fices in Greene County, Alabama, in 1970.255 Michigan’s Freedom
Now Party ran candidates in thirty-nine state elections in 1964 in or-
der to elect more militant blacks and to admonish Democrats and
Republicans that black voters could not be ignored.256 The Peace and
Freedom Party placed renowned Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver on
253. See id. at 187. Walton notes that black political parties of both the satellite and inde-
pendent variety seek “to bring the black man to a position of power within the American po-
litical system,” id., and he argues that “the opportunities which black parties give blacks for self-
determination and independence in politics . . . make[] black parties play such an important role
in the new black politics.” Id. at 203-04 (emphasis in original). See also Earl Ofari, Independent
Black Politics: An Old Idea, THE BLACK SCHOLAR, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 19, 22) (noting the per-
ennial black demand for power-sharing, including that of Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, who insisted, “where we [blacks] are 20% of the voters, we should command 20% of
the top jobs, 20% of the judgeships, 20% of the commissionerships and 20% of all political ap-
pointments”).
Professor Lani Guinier’s criticisms of black-majority, single-member districts are rele-
vant here. Professor Guinier has argued, in substance, that measuring black electoral success by
the number of black representatives elected elevates symbolic representation above interest
representation. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 54-55 (1994). She sug-
gests that majority-minority districts fail to adequately address the issues of legislative influ-
ence and coalition-building within prejudiced policymaking bodies. See id. She argues for the
use of a system of interest representation in which modified at-large systems would replace sin-
gle-member districts and voters would possess as many votes as there are open seats. Each
voter would be allowed to aggregate his votes as he sees fits, clumping all of his votes on one
candidate if he chooses or spreading them across several. See id. at 94-97. Where there is a po-
litically cohesive group of racial minorities, they can vote strategically to elect the candidate(s)
of their choice. This arrangement facilitates cross-racial coalition-building because it allows
“voluntary constituencies” to self-identify their political interests rather than having those in-
terests artificially imposed on them through geographic districting. See id. at 97.
Professor Guinier’s proposal may be one way to reduce the impulse to exit that this Arti-
cle contends Abrams v. Johnson creates. However, within the context of the single-member,
winner-take-all districts currently in use for congressional elections, a systemic inequality be-
tween blacks and whites in their ability to influence the redistricting process cannot lend vitality
to the two-party system.
254. See WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 77.
255. See Hanes Walton, Jr. & William H. Boone, Black Political Parties: A Demographic
Analysis, 5 J. BLACK STUD. 86, 88 (1974).
256. See WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 198-99.
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the presidential ballots of nearly twenty states in 1968.257 And
throughout the past few decades, black leaders and intelligentsia
have gathered together to contemplate formation of an independent
black third party.258
The defendant-intervenors in Abrams, who urged the Court to
show deference to Georgia’s stated preference for at least two black
congressional districts,259 echoed a decades-long call for power shar-
ing. They maintained that white bloc voting prevented the successful
election of black congressmen.260 The irony is that blacks’ chosen
party, the Democrats, heeded their call for power sharing, but the
Court did not. From the standpoint of black voters, however, it does
not matter that the decision which has prevented their equal partici-
pation has come from the Court rather than from the Democratic
Party itself. The doctrine of “separate but equal” announced in Plessy
v. Ferguson261 demonstrates that the Court can be as discriminatory as
any state actor. And the unwillingness of Georgia’s Democrat-
controlled assembly to reenact its plan calling for two black districts
on remand from Miller v. Johnson only proves that the Court’s
heightened scrutiny of black districts may be exploited by the Demo-
cratic Party to whitewash its elected leadership. In effect, then, the
Court has positioned itself as a pawn in the tug-of-war for power be-
tween black and white Democrats.
1. Distinctions Between Black and White Exit. Perhaps a fair—or
at least doctrinally consistent—response to the threat of black exodus
from the two-party system is a non-response. Political factions, after
all, enjoy a right to exit from (and to move within) the two-party
system that is fundamental to maintenance of a liberal democracy:
257. See id. at 199.
258. See, e.g., Flewellen, supra note 246, at 100-01 (discussing the meeting of the National
Black Independent Political Party convention after the election of Ronald Reagan, which
“signaled to Blacks that all the gains of the civil rights movement would come under attack”);
Ron Daniels, The National Black Political Assembly: Building Independent Black Politics in the
1980s, BLACK SCHOLAR, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 32) (discussing the deliberations of the National
Black Political Assembly through the 1970s and 1980s).
259. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1930 (1997).
260. See id. at 1935-37. The defendant-intervenors in Abrams contended that there was sub-
stantial racial bloc voting in Georgia, but the district court rejected their evidence to this effect.
See id. While the majority found that the district court’s conclusions were not clearly erroneous,
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, noted that of the black representatives in the Georgia legislature,
all except one were elected from predominantly black districts. See id. at 1945 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
261. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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“[C]itizens may, of their own volition, move away from other
citizens—based on whatever reason they have for moving—and still
govern themselves as a public entity.”262 Thus, it is not
unconstitutional for the government to grant ballot access to or
otherwise to recognize the Republican Party even though its modern
incarnation consists of racially conservative whites who exited the
Democratic Party because of its embrace of racial liberalism.263 As
long as membership in the Republican Party continues to be
available on a race-neutral basis, the party may constitutionally
exercise public power despite its views and the racial homogeneity of
its membership.264 The same is true of those whites who exit the two-
party system, voting, for example, for George Wallace’s American
Independent Party,265 or Ross Perot’s Reform Party:266 they exit of
their own volition, and, no matter what their reasons for exiting, we
cannot divest them of political or policy authority simply because of
those reasons, or because of the racial composition of the parties for
which they vote. Thus, the liberal democratic argument for non-
response asks: since we have allowed whites to exit freely from the
two-party system, why should there be special concern with a black
exodus?
The circumstances under which racial minorities would exit the
system, however, differ significantly from those under which whites
do, particularly after Abrams. First, “African-American political
262. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 45 (1996) (discussing problems of exit in the context of nomic—or religious—communities
that live apart from mainstream society and seek government aid in the creation of nomic-
specific school districts). This Article uses the concept of “exit” in a narrower sense than it is
used in Professor Greene’s discussion. In the context of party politics, we are not concerned
with questions of physical separation, though Miller v. Johnson and the Supreme Court’s preoc-
cupation with black districts’ shapes indirectly raises issues of spatiality and geography.
263. See supra note 180 (discussing a shift in the Republican approach to civil rights).
264. See Greene, supra note 262, at 45 (stating that citizens who successfully move away
from other citizens may not “use this public power to exclude on the basis of religion or
race . . . but if the public power, at least temporarily . . . runs in effect to a group homogeneous
as to religion or race, then it is wrong to say that the government has ‘segregated’ or has ‘forced
separation’”).
265. Alabama Governor George Wallace ran on this party’s “anti-Negro” platform in the
1968 presidential election, capturing 10 million popular votes and 46 electoral votes. See
WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 189. Wallace’s supporters would later
defect to the Republican Party. See DAWSON, supra note 101, at 106.
266. Billionaire Ross Perot made a surprisingly strong showing in the 1992 presidential
election, capturing nearly 20% of the popular vote. In 1996, running under the banner of the
Reform Party, Perot received only 8% of the popular vote. See Susan Benkelman, Weakened
Perot Faces Future Full of Questions, DENVER POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at A6.
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choice is [unusually] constrained” because black voters almost uni-
formly support candidates and parties that represent racial reform.267
Yet the threat of white exit constrains the degree to which a party or
candidate is willing to stand for racial reform. White exit, whether
from or within the two-party system, has a capacity to transform a
major party—particularly on matters of race—that minorities mani-
festly lack. The transformation of the Republican Party from the
black-supported party of Lincoln to one of racial conservatism attests
to the transformative capacity of white movement. By contrast,
Democrats’ steady movement to the political center (and at times to
the right), reflecting the party’s uneasiness with the appearance of
being dominated by blacks, evidences the check that the threat of
white exit exercises even on the black-supported party.268 Thus, even
before Abrams, black options within the traditional two-party system
were severely limited. Abrams, however, more drastically differenti-
ates racial groups by imposing on minorities unique disabilities in the
apportionment process: white homogeneity is not taken into account
in assessing the constitutionality of white voters’ demands in the re-
districting process, but black homogeneity is weighted prominently.
Under these circumstances, blacks do not enjoy the same right to exit
from and within the two-party system as do whites. Blacks’ potential
exit from the two-party system cannot be viewed as an ordinary exer-
cise of liberal democracy’s right to exit. Their actions must instead be
viewed as the product of discrimination—more akin to the formation
of South Carolina’s United Citizens’ Party than to voluntary disaf-
filiation.
The constitutional overtones of a black exodus from the two-
party system are also distinct from those of white exit. Since at least
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,269 the Supreme Court’s Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence has been nominally color-blind,
rejecting in all but the narrowest of circumstances the concept that
we must consider race in order to reduce the salience of race.270 A
267. DAWSON, supra note 101, at 131.
268. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. See also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Ra-
cial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 135-36 (1994) (“[T]he presiden-
tial politics of the 1950s reveals that . . . the immediate political imperative of balancing appeals
to northern blacks and liberals against those to southern white racial conservatives deterred
either party from charting bold new paths on civil rights.”).
269. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
270. See, e.g., id. at 493-94 (affirming that “the standard of review under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classifi-
cation”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226, 237 (1995) (subjecting
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black exodus would challenge both the moral and the legal authority
of the Court’s approach: the Court may insist that states eschew race
in redistricting, but in order to take race out of the political process
the Court must convince blacks that it ought not be a consideration.
A black party would represent the ultimate failure of the Court’s ef-
forts, for race would then become more, not less, salient. Unlike
other categories of affirmative action, in which blacks are largely a
captive audience to the Court’s color-blind rhetoric, politics is an
arena vulnerable to effective black backlash. The question for the
Court is not whether black racial consciousness is a good or bad
thing, but how best to accommodate its reality without destroying the
fabric of states’ two-party political systems and estranging the very
groups whose inclusion is essential to the Court’s aspiration of a
color-blind society.
2. The Practicality and Inertia Factors. Perhaps the Court
believes that the possibility of black exodus from the two-party
system is too remote to be a serious consideration. Save for a few
local parties that continue to field candidates successfully, black third
party movements, like white ones, have been relatively
unsuccessful.271 From the standpoint of doctrinal coherency, however,
it ought not matter what the history of black third party movements
has been: the Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence should be consistent
and complementary, encouraging the inclusion of racial minorities in
the two-party mainstream to the same extent as whites. Moveover,
history may be of limited guidance after Abrams v. Johnson. The
Court’s tolerance of political gerrymandering enables blacks to make
demands as a third party which would be constitutionally suspect
under Abrams were the same goals pursued within the Democratic
Party. Under this state of affairs, the classic arguments against black
third parties—that they leave blacks without influence in the political
mainstream where policymaking will actually occur—hold
considerably less sway. A black third party could operate as an
independent party for purposes of redistricting—thus gaining the
black seats that Abrams would otherwise deny blacks—but act as a
all racial classifications, even purportedly benign classifications, to strict scrutiny, but insisting
that this test is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”) (citations omitted). Despite the Court’s
precatory statements regarding the continued ability of governments to address the lingering
effects of historical discrimination, see id. at 509-10, the Supreme Court has yet to uphold a
race-based remedy under strict scrutiny. See Spann, supra note 180, at 22-23 & nn.104-05.
271. See WALTON, BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 31, at 201.
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satellite party to a major party (presumably the Democrats) within
the legislatures to which its members were elected. Interest-
convergence would encourage, if not compel, an enfeebled
Democratic Party to broker mutually advantageous political
compromises with their erstwhile black members.272
Past may not be prologue for yet another reason. In Abrams and
its progeny, the Court for the first time has found in the Constitution
unique restrictions on the ability of major parties to respond volun-
tarily to black aspirations for representation. Previous opinions had
addressed racial minorities’ efforts to use the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act to impose increased
black representation on parties and the localities which they govern.
Abrams is extraordinary because it restricts racial minorities’ ability
to use political processes to persuade the major parties of the need
for black representation. Given this “first,” it is folly to predict cava-
lierly that a black third party movement will not take root.
Even if past were prologue, however, history reveals that third
parties have played substantial roles in effectuating racial justice, and
that blacks have been willing to associate themselves with minor par-
ties for that purpose. In 1840, for example, the abolitionist platform
of the Liberty Party helped to rekindle Negro interest in politics and
to reignite the Negro “freedom movement.”273 The Liberty Party
would three years later open its national convention to black dele-
gates, providing blacks “with their first opportunity to participate in a
political convention.”274 Subsequent abolitionist third parties, the
Free Soilers and the Political Abolition Party, also served to promote
the cause of racial justice and to spur black interest and participa-
tion.275 Ironically, the anti-slavery stances of these parties were popu-
272. See Bell, supra note 174, at 523 (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will
be accommodated only when it converges with the interest of whites.”).
273. See HANES WALTON, JR., THE NEGRO IN THIRD PARTY POLITICS 12 (1969)
[hereinafter WALTON, THIRD PARTY POLITICS]. Walton maintains that despite widespread
disenfranchisement among blacks, “it can be assumed that many Negroes did support the po-
litical movement.” Id. at 11. In fact, the National Convention of Colored Citizens, which in-
cluded such black abolitionist luminaries as Frederick Douglass, later officially endorsed both
the principles of the Liberty Party and the party itself. See id. at 13-14.
274. Id. at 14. Several black delegates were appointed to high-ranking positions on various
party committees. See id. In addition, the Convention adopted resolutions calling for the equal
treatment of black citizens and welcoming them into the ranks of the party. See id.
275. See id. at 18-19. Attesting to the extent of black involvement in these parties, the Po-
litical Abolition Party nominated Frederick Douglass as its vice presidential candidate in 1856.
See id. Douglass, however, declined the nomination. See id.
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larized in 1856 and 1860 by the most famous and enduring of all
American third parties, the Republican Party.276 The Republican
Party displaced the Whig Party as one of the two major political par-
ties in the United States.277
Third parties’ advocacy of racial justice and blacks’ resultant
embrace of such parties are not limited to so-called “constitutional
moments”278 like the slavery crisis. For instance, the activities of the
Progressive Citizens of America in 1948 furthered the civil rights
agenda of black Americans.279 While he was ultimately not able to
carry the black vote or to win the presidency, the party’s nominee,
Henry Wallace, campaigned vigorously for black equality, posing a
substantial risk that black Democrats would bolt from the Demo-
cratic Party.280 This threat apparently aided a “shift in attitude and
policy by [President Harry S.] Truman,” which in turn “caused a po-
litical shift in the Negro community.”281 In short, when mainstream
avenues for political participation have been unavailable, blacks have
embraced minor parties to advance the cause of racial justice, at least
until the major parties were willing to be equally responsive.282
As long as blacks themselves view black representation as a sig-
nificant indicator of racial justice, the Supreme Court’s restrictions
on the ability of the major parties to afford such representation to
their black constituencies will remain starkly at odds with the Court’s
and the states’ desire for two-party political stability.
276. See id. at 20.
277. See id. at 1.
278. “Constitutional moments” is Professor Bruce Ackerman’s name for periods of Ameri-
can history, such as the advent of the New Deal, that occur outside the realm of normal politics
and that effectively reinterpret, or amend, the Constitution outside the restrictions of Article V.
See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1022, 1054-56 (1984).
279. See WALTON, THIRD PARTY POLITICS, supra note 273, at 80.
280. See id. at 56-58.
281. Id. at 59. Specifically, President Truman submitted his civil rights proposals to Con-
gress and established a Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services and a Fair Employment Practice Board. See id. at 58. President Truman forwarded
these initiatives at the urging of a close advisor who had calculated that the black vote in north-
ern cities might well decide the election. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 180, at 199.
282. See WALTON, THIRD PARTY POLITICS, supra note 273, at 81. Walton writes:
[T]hird parties have at various times given the Negro the opportunity to become vo-
cal on the race issue, when the major parties had side-stepped or dropped the issue.
However, when faced with bigger and better opportunities for agitation and the
chance to continue to remind the nation of the Negro’s plight, Negroes have not hesi-
tated to leave the smaller third parties.
Id.
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3. The Shifting Political Environment. As the twenty-first century
nears, blacks must participate in a changing political environment,
and this environment may work in combination with the forces
outlined above to fragment racially the two-party system. Some of
the transformations are uniform in their impact—they do not
uniquely relate to race. For instance, billionaire Ross Perot’s two
presidential bids and the formation of the Reform Party have
augmented the prospects for a successful third major party that
would not necessarily revolve around minority issues.283 Furthermore,
the continued dealignment of the electorate (the deterioration of
voter identification with either of the two major parties)284 poses a
risk to two-party stability independent of black protest.
There has also been a general rightward shift in the American
political context—a turn of events that creates a unique impetus to
exit for racial minorities. During the twelve years of the presidencies
of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the political context of black
participation was unfavorably altered.285 Reagan’s ascendancy to the
presidency in 1980 began the rollback of the advancements made
during the civil rights era.286 Noting Reagan’s desire to appeal to
southern racial conservatives, political scientist Hanes Walton, Jr.,
concludes:
By reintroducing racial cleavages for partisan gain, the Reagan-Bush
Republicans turned the anger, resentment, and frustration of whites
to their own partisan advantage.
African Americans’ efforts to attain their civil rights were recon-
structed as a zero-sum game in which whites were the losers. Prob-
lems in the nation’s African American-governed urban areas be-
came acute, and the hard-fought constitutional attainments of the
preceding decades were put into jeopardy. Forward motion on the
unfinished agenda of the civil rights movement was stalled while Af-
283. See Joseph E. Haviland, Recent Decisions, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 36
DUQ. L. REV. 207, 224 (1997).
284. See supra note 8.
285. See Hanes Walton, Jr., Prospects, in AFRICAN AMERICAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE
POLITICAL CONTEXT VARIABLE 369, 370-71 (Robert Y. Shapiro ed., 1997).
286. See Hanes Walton, Jr. & William O. Generett, Jr., African Americans, Political Con-
text, and The Clinton Presidency: The Legacy of the Past in the Future, in AFRICAN AMERICAN
POWER AND POLITICS, supra note 285, at 373, 373-74.
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
66 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1
rican Americans and their civil rights allies engaged in damage con-
trol to maintain some degree of stability.287
While estranged from the Republicans, blacks have been unable
to look optimistically to the Democratic Party, which has been forced
by the “Reagan-Bush contextual revolution” to drift from its histori-
cal commitment to assisting blacks.288 Indeed, the Democratic Party
of the 1990s “has moved to the right of center.”289 These shifts render
it “easier for mainstream African American voters to consider third-
party candidates in lieu of their traditional affinity for Democratic
party candidates.”290
Thus, the effect of Abrams v. Johnson does not occur in a vac-
uum but rather in a political environment in which voter loyalty gen-
erally, and black voter fealty specifically, are already strained. A
ballot-box rule that fuels party infidelity among blacks (particularly
when there is no tangible injury to whites’ right to vote) is a doctrine
fundamentally at odds with the notion of two-party political stability.
Moreover, it is stunningly inappropriate to allow the reverse-racial
gerrymandering decisions to exact their greatest toll on the bulwarks
of the two-party system: black voters are the most reliable Demo-
cratic partisans in America.291 A rational two-party paradigm, one
that is consistent with the principles of Davis v. Bandemer, would
permit the major parties to reward their most loyal adherents in the
most important partisan process—redistricting.
IV. THE CROSSROADS OF TIMMONS AND ABRAMS: GREATER
INSTABILITY?
The Court’s evident discomfort with both minor parties’ and
black voters’ efforts to participate in the two-party process is not co-
incidental. Rather, it reveals a consistent misapprehension of the
constitutional injury asserted by the plaintiffs in both the third party
287. Id. at 374.
288. Id. at 375.
289. Hanes Walton, Jr., African Americans and The Clinton Presidency: Political Appoint-
ments as Social Justice, in AFRICAN AMERICAN POWER AND POLITICS, supra note 285, at 313,
322; see also Dana Milbank, Party Crashers, NEW REPUBLIC, June 15, 1998, at 21, 23 (noting
that the Democratic Party has drifted right and characterizing its recruits for the 1998 congres-
sional elections as follows: “[S]ome of these New Democrats sound so much like Republicans
that it’s not very clear why they aren’t Republicans in the first place.”).
290. See Walton & Generett, supra note 286, at 375.
291. See DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMAN-
DERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 59 (1997).
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cases and the reverse-racial gerrymandering cases. This section first
explicates this parallel, and then demonstrates its practical effect on
two-party stability.
A. The Deference-Injury Nexus: A Second Look
Recall the argument made in Part III that the Court’s recogni-
tion of the injuries in Shaw and Abrams marked a departure from its
prior ballot-box cases, which required, as a threshold matter, that the
plaintiffs had suffered an injury to voting.292 The Court in Abrams
presumed a constitutional injury293 en route to subjecting the forma-
tion of two of Georgia’s majority-minority districts to strict scru-
tiny.294 In Timmons, there was no need for a presumption: the Court
acknowledged that Minnesota’s anti-fusion law prevented the New
Party from nominating its chosen candidate.295 Yet the Court mini-
mized this quite tangible injury in order to avoid applying strict scru-
tiny. The Court achieved this result by judicial sleight of hand: it de-
clined to apply strict scrutiny because the injury to the New Party was
not “severe,” but it failed to point to any antecedent definition of se-
verity.296 Having concluded that the burdens imposed by Minnesota’s
anti-fusion ban “though not trivial,” were “not severe,” the Court re-
quired Minnesota to present regulatory interests “sufficiently weighty
to justify the limitation.”297 Given that the state was not required to
present empirical evidence to meet its burden,298 this test, too, begged
292. See supra notes 204-215 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a constitutional
injury in recent racial gerrymandering cases).
294. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1931 (1997) (noting that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review where, as in this case, race is “the predominant factor in con-
structing the . . . [d]istrict”).
295. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1997).
296. See id. at 1372. The Court was content to supply a laundry list of restrictions that the
anti-fusion ban did not impose on the New Party—the ban did not “restrict the ability of the
New Party and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like,” nor did it
“directly limit the Party’s access to the ballot.” Id. But while it is certain that Minnesota could
have attempted to impose more severe restrictions on the New Party, the party may neverthe-
less have suffered substantial injury by not being allowed to nominate the candidate of its
choice.
297. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
298. See id.
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a definitional question: what renders a justification “sufficiently
weighty”?299
After Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, however, doctrinal consis-
tency would seem to dictate that the kind of injury suffered by the
New Party would warrant application of heightened constitutional
scrutiny. The plaintiffs in Timmons at least suffered a tangible injury
related to voting. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Abrams were allowed
to proceed based on broad notions of stigma, an immeasurable harm
which they might have suffered with or without government action.
Deprivation of the ability to nominate the candidate of one’s choice
is a limitation uniquely related to the government’s ability to control
the electoral machinery of the state. The Court cannot reasonably
recognize a “representational” harm in its racial gerrymandering
cases but ignore the actual representational injury to the New
Party.300
It can, of course, be argued that there is nothing extraordinary
about the Court’s differing treatments of injury in the two cases: the
Court in Abrams was more solicitous of the plaintiffs’ injury because
it concluded that Georgia’s majority-minority districts divided voters
by race. But the “race is different” argument fails in this instance.
The Court’s application of strict scrutiny in Abrams actually disad-
vantaged black participation in the two-party process. Similarly, its
application of a lesser standard of review in Timmons disproportion-
ately harmed racial minorities because these groups constituted such
a large share of the New Party’s membership.301 Of course, disparate
impact alone may not transform the New Party’s claim into one of ra-
cial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.302 There is, however, an analytical tension in
employing strict scrutiny to restrict black participation in the two-
party system in one case, only to employ a lesser standard of scrutiny
299. See Pope, supra note 30, at 480 (referring to the Court’s test as “ludicrously circular on
its face” but acknowledging that it does signal greater deference to the state than strict scru-
tiny).
300. Cf. Foster, supra note 179, at 1172 (characterizing the right to a color-blind electoral
process as not “as weighty as impediments to the right to vote”).
301. As argued throughout this Article, in view of Abrams, minorities may come to consti-
tute a disproportionate share of the third party movement generally. See supra Parts II and III.
302. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[W]e have not held that a law,
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is in-
valid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of
one race than of another.”).
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in another case to again restrict black participation.303 Moreover, after
the Shaw v. Reno line of cases, it is far from clear that the disparate
impact on minority voters’ opportunity to nominate the candidate of
their choice would not violate the Equal Protection Clause. By ap-
plying strict scrutiny in the absence of a specific intent to harm an
identifiable group in its reverse-racial gerrymandering cases,304 the
Court may have opened the door to a similar relaxation of the trigger
for heightened scrutiny in other contexts, including cases like Tim-
mons.305
Despite the appropriateness of recognizing the New Party’s in-
jury as substantial in view of the latitude afforded by its racial gerry-
mandering decisions, the Court in Timmons demurred. The Court’s
comfort with entrenched interests suggested in the comparison be-
tween Timmons and Tashjian306 thus becomes more apparent in
aligning the plaintiffs’ injuries in Timmons and Abrams, for in both
of the latter cases white voters (another entrenched interest) were
better served by the Court’s holding than were racial minorities. The
Court’s misapprehension of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries also has
consequences for the very definition of political stability which it has
openly embraced, for in each case the Court either overlooked or in-
correctly analyzed the state’s interest in the maintenance of stable
two-party government.307 Thus, the nexus between deference to
states’ political interests and the Court’s assessment of injury is a
fairly consistent one. Although Timmons posed this equation in the
more familiar formalism versus protective democracy context of
303. The factual differences between Abrams and Timmons do not lessen this absurdity.
Assume that instead of the New Party, the plaintiffs in Timmons were the New Black and Tan
Party. Just as black voters in Abrams sought to participate in the political process as black vot-
ers, members of the New Black and Tan Party, as a black party, would seek to co-nominate the
Democratic candidate. Yet Georgia’s attempt to integrate black voters into the two-party po-
litical mainstream triggered strict scrutiny while Minnesota’s efforts to block this same result
would prompt a far more deferential standard of review.
304. See Foster, supra note 179, at 1161-63.
305. Even under traditional, pre-Shaw equal protection analysis, state action which system-
atically deprives minority voters of the ability to forge coalitions to nominate their preferred
candidate may well abridge the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears
more heavily on one race than another.”). This scenario could happen, if, over time, racial bloc
voting within the major parties in combination with state anti-fusion bans consistently prevent
minorities from nominating the candidates of their choice.
306. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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Davis v. Bandemer, its ramifications are fundamentally linked to
Abrams’ deprivation of minimal formal equality for black voters in
the traditional two-party system.
B. The Making of Outcasts
While Abrams renders it more difficult for racial minorities to
participate on an equal basis in the “critical and traditional”308 party
activity of redistricting, Timmons erects a barrier to their engaging in
the relatively nontraditional partisan activity of fusion.309 Yet the dep-
rivation of traditional means often leads to the adoption of untradi-
tional ones. In fusion, as in satellite politics, dissenting voices are
given a place within the two-party structure without submerging their
individual political identities. The suggestion here is not that fusion is
the same as operating as a satellite party—it is not. However, fusion
fits well within the spectrum of activities tied to the two-party sys-
tem—from registering with the Democrats or Republicans to not
formally affiliating but voting at the invitation of these parties. The
Supreme Court’s treatment of it as alien strongly resembles its treat-
ment of black Georgians’ satellite-type activity in Abrams. The Court
308. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
309. Fusion is untraditional in the sense that most states now bar it. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct.
at 1369 n.6 (noting that in the twentieth century fusion has been limited and is now barred in
most states). Thirteen states expressly prohibit fusion candidacies. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
137 (1993); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-12(9) (West 1993); IND. CODE § 3-10-1-15 (1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.335 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18:1280.25 (West Supp. 1998) (banning fusion in presidential primaries); MINN.
STAT. § 204B.06(1)(b) (1992); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.351 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-612(3)
(1997); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2870 (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(f)(1) (Supp.
1997); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 162.015(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 8.15(7)
(West 1996).
Twenty states and the District of Columbia effectively prohibit fusion by requiring that a
candidate be a registered member of the party whose nomination he seeks. See ALA. CODE §§
17-16-12, 17-16-14 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.030(14) (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
311(A) (West 1996); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8022(a) (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-
601(2) (West 1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1312(a)(1)(A), (r)(1)-(2) (1981 & Supp. 1998); FLA.
STAT. ch. 99.021(1)(b) (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 12-3(a)(7) (1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 334 (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A- 1(a) (1997); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 53, § 48 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.177 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:14
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-5 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-2, 1-8-18 (Michie
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.07 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-105 (1997); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 17-14-1 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-7 (Supp. 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-204
(Michie 1997).
Four states achieve a ban on fusion by permitting a candidate to accept only one nomina-
tion. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.39 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.692 (1989); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-10-303 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-12-06 (1997).
SMITHCORRECTIONS.DOC 02/10/99 9:28 AM
1998] A BLACK PARTY? 71
undervalued the kinds of party activity most conducive to the inclu-
sion of racial minorities in each case because it asked the wrong ques-
tion. In Abrams, the question was not whether the Second and Elev-
enth Congressional Districts were drawn on grounds of race; instead,
the appropriate inquiry was whether the confluence of interests and
processes that led to the creation of those districts were any different
from those endorsed by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Davis v.
Bandemer. And in Timmons, the simple issue should have been
whether fusion can rationally be categorized as a major-party activity.
Since it clearly can be, and since the activity was welcomed by the
major party, the state’s burden should have been heavy indeed.310
Let us return a final time to the hypothetical travails of the New
Black and Tan Party. Recall that their agreement with Georgia
Democrats is that they will be given the two additional congressional
seats that Abrams denied them if New Black and Tan Party members
pledge support for the Democrats’ statewide candidates.311 But what
form will this support take? While New Black and Tan members
might simply vote for the Democrats’ candidate on the Democratic
line of the ballot, this would hurt the status of their party. Like most
states, Georgia bans multi-party or fusion candidacies.312 At the same
time, in order to constitute a “political party” in Georgia, an organi-
zation’s candidate must have garnered at least 20% of the statewide
vote in the preceding gubernatorial or presidential election.313 A fail-
ure to satisfy this threshold showing would relegate the New Black
and Tan Party to the status of “political body.”314 As such, the party
would be subject to numerous restrictions not applicable to political
parties, including a requirement that it obtain the signatures of 5% of
the eligible voters for each office it sought in order to place its candi-
310. In this regard, the Court’s inability to appreciate the different ways in which voters
might choose to participate in the two-party system bodes poorly for two-party stability no mat-
ter what the racial composition of the minor party. It is clear that the Court’s view of major-
party activity, and hence its definition of two-party stability, is a static one that fails to consider
how the growing dealignment of the electorate might lead voters to affiliate with the two major
parties in different ways, such as through fusion.
311. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
312. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-137 (1993) (stating that a candidate may not “qualify with
any political party as a candidate for nomination to any public office when such person has
qualified for the same primary with another political party”).
313. See id. § 21-2-2 (Supp. 1998).
314. Id. This discussion assumes that New Black and Tans are otherwise able to satisfy the
20% threshold. This is a reasonable supposition: in the hypothetical described in Part II.A.,
most of Georgia’s 28% black population belong to the party. See supra text accompanying note
102.
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date on the ballot.315 If fusion were allowed, the Democratic candi-
date could appear on the ballot twice—once as a Democrat, once as
the New Black and Tan candidate—and the New Black and Tan
Party could support the Democratic nominee for governor without
sacrificing its status as a political party because its votes could be
disaggregated from the total votes received by the Democratic nomi-
nee.316 The Hobson’s choice presented in the Georgia scenario could
repeat itself in each of the other states in which the Supreme Court
has struck down majority-minority congressional districts.317
Whether the New Black and Tan Party decides to adhere to the
deal and subject itself to the more restrictive requirements of minor-
party status will depend on its cost-benefit analysis, but its decision is
less important than the doctrinal morass which imposes that choice
on it in the first place. It is odd enough that in the name of racial
harmony Abrams promotes the making of deals between Democrats
and putative third parties that would be impermissible between white
and black Democrats. But it is positively bizarre that under the guise
of political stability Timmons threatens to break those deals and en-
courage separatism over coalition-building.
315. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-170(b) (Supp. 1998) (requiring that the nomination peti-
tion for a candidate in a non-statewide race be signed by “5 percent of the total number of reg-
istered voters eligible to vote in the last election”). See also McCrary v. Poythress, 638 F.2d
1308, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding constitutionality of Georgia’s 5% requirement).
316. But see Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1305 (1996) (distinguishing fusion from disaggregation while noting that
the latter is often implicit in the former). The note explains:
Although disaggregation does not change which candidate wins an election, whether
a state that allows fusion must disaggregate the votes of multiparty nominees is a
critical issue . . . . [U]nless there is a formal method by which votes are attributed to
the minor party, the party will be unable to satisfy the ballot access or ballot status
provisions that condition political opportunity on some quantum of electoral support.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
317. For example, Texas, where Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), arose, forbids fusion.
See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 162.015 (West Supp. 1998). It also conditions political party
status upon the number of votes received in statewide general elections, see id. § 181.005
(requiring 5% in order to qualify as a major party), and imposes signature requirements on or-
ganizations not achieving the requisite votes. See id. § 142.007. North Carolina, home to the
landmark wrongful districting decision Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), bans fusion by re-
quiring that the candidate be registered with the party for whom she is nominated. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-106(b) (1995). Like Georgia, it conditions major-party status on the number
of votes obtained in the last preceding gubernatorial or presidential election. See id. § 163-96(a)
(imposing a 10% threshold). Minor parties must satisfy petition procedures in order to nomi-
nate a candidate. See id. § 163-96(b).
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CONCLUSION
Baldwin’s dilemma318 is alive and festering. The Supreme Court’s
continuing failure to address race in politics by acknowledging the re-
alities of race will continue to fracture political processes, possibly to
a point of racial splintering of the two-party system. At some point,
whether by collision or conscience, the Supreme Court will have to
face the fact that the concept of political stability so loosely employed
in Timmons has a racial dimension applicable in redistricting cases as
well. If, as Abrams reaffirms, the state infringes upon a citizen’s
guarantee to equal protection of the laws by intentionally separating
electoral units along racial lines, it must be free to discourage the
formation of effectively segregated political parties. History and logic
dictate that this task will require allowing the major parties to negoti-
ate power-sharing arrangements with the constituents of those parties
regardless of whether the result is a majority-minority district. The
Supreme Court’s two-party stability rationale has modern justifica-
tion when viewed not merely as a protection against the multiplica-
tion of minor parties but rather as a guard against splinter coalitions
which contravene the color-blind ideals of Abrams.
In this regard, Baldwin issued an admonition about the Ameri-
can racial dilemma that both the Court and voters might do well to
heed:
Everything now, we must assume, is in our hands; we have no right
to assume otherwise. If we—and now I mean the relatively conscious
whites and the relatively conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, in-
sist on, or create, the consciousness of the others—do not falter in
our duty now, we may be able, handful that we are, to end the racial
nightmare, and achieve our country, and change the history of the
world. If we do not now dare everything, the fulfillment of that
prophecy, re-created from the Bible in song by a slave, is upon us:
God gave Noah the rainbow sign, No more water, the fire next time!319
318. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
319. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 119-20 (Dial Press 1963) (1962).
